Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

The State of Utah, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Dennis J. Garcia,
Defendant-Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah vs. Garcia, No. 20141009 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3309

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellee

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS

DENNIS J GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant

)
)

---------------- ----------------))
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE, a governmenta'l
agency of the State of Utah,
and UTAH OFFICE OF DEBT
COLLECTION, a governmental
agency of the State of Utah,

Intervenors and
real-parties-in-interest
Appel lees

}

)
)
)

)
)

)
)

)

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

)
)

Appellate Case No. 20141009CA

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
The Honorable Randall N Skanchy, District Judge

STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney at Law
2877 West 9150 South
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
DENNIS J GARCIA
SEAN REYES
Utah Attorney General
NANCY KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Utah Attorney General
PO Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Attorneys for Intervenors and Appellees

·

FILED

l!,JTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR O1 2015

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
DENNIS J GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

--------------------------------)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE, a governmental
agency of the State of Utah,
and UTAH OFFICE OF DEBT
COLLECTION, a governmental
agency of the State of Utah,
Intervenors and
real-parties-in-interest
Appel lees

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Appellate Case No. 20141009CA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

. 7

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

.

.

.

.

.

4

7

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . 12
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

19

ARGUMENT
I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING
THAT THE COURT HAD "NO JURISDICTION" TO CONSIDER
AND RULE UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO "SET ASIDE"
THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" RESULTING FROM THE
FILING AND ENTRY OF THE "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
22

II
THE BOARD'S ACKNOWLEDGED FAILURE
TO CONDUCT A "FULL HEARING"
CONCERNING THE "RESTITUTION"
TO BE ORDERED AGAINST DEFENDANT
INVALIDATES THE BOARD-MADE "ORDER OF RESTITUTION",
ITSELF VOID AB INITIO, WHICH RENDERS
DEFECTIVE, INEFFECTIVE AND ILLEGAL
THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" WHICH SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
. 32
III
THE BOARD-ORDERED "RESTITUTION" FOR "FUNERAL EXPENSES"
IS STATUTORILY DEFECTIVE AND INVALID DUE TO THE BOARD'S
FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADHERE TO THE STATUTORY DEFINITION
OF "PECUNIARY DAMAGES", WHICH IN THIS CASE FOR TIME-BARRED
PURSUANT TO APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR
"WRONGFUL DEATH" CLAIMS
.

.

.

•

.

.

•

.

.

.

.

. 46

IV
THE BOARD-CREATED AND BOARD-FILED "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
IS DEFECTIVE AND INVALID, DUE TO ITS UNTIMELY "MAKING"
WHICH DID NOT OCCUR WITHIN THE STATUTORILY-PRESCRIBED
PERIOD OF TIME (77-27-6(4): "WITHIN 60 DAYS")
OF THE PRISONER'S RELEASE FROM CUSTODY;
THE RESULTANT "CIVIL JUDGMENT" MUST BE SET ASIDE

. so

V

THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-27-5(3)
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE
"OPEN COURTS" PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
[ARTICLE I, SECTION 11]

~
'

57
CONCLUSION . . . . . .

67

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ["BAD FAITH" LITIGATION]

70

REQUEST FOR "ORAL ARGUMENT"

. 70

COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION ["WORD COUNT" AND PRINT SIZE]

. 71

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

71

ADDENDA

73
2
STEPHEN G HOMER
,,_ TTOFi.NEY AT l.4 'N

~

ATTACHMENT 1
Board-prepared "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
[prepared 24 September 2013; filed 10 October 2013]
RECORD at 119
ATTACHMENT 2
District Court "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER"
[11 April 2014]
RECORD at 279-282
ATTACHMENT 3
District Court "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER"
[21 August 2014]
RECORD at 593-596
ATTACHMENT 4
"ORDER OF THE COURT" (Final Judgment)
[29 September 2014]
RECORD at 604-607
ATTACHMENT 5
Excerpts from May 2008 PRESENTENCE REPORT [pp. 1, 5]
RECORD at 172, 176
ATTACHMENT 6
"Docket History" Gail Buckley vs Dennis Joseph Garcia
Third Judicial District Court, Civil No . .080903244
ATTACHMENT 7
June 2008 "General Release and Settlement Agreement"
Gail Buckley vs Dennis Joseph Garcia
Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 080903244
RECORD at 385-387
ATTACHMENT 8
Board-prepared "ORIGINAL HEARING" document
[7 October 2010]
RECORD at 188
ATTACHMENT 9
Board-prepared "HEARING OFFICER RESULTS" document
[13 October 2010]
RECORD at 190
ATTACHMENT 10
Board's May 2011 "Letter" to Garcia relatives
RECORD at 192
ATTACHMENT 11
Corrections Department-prepared "NORMS Statements"
[13 June 2008; 31 March 2013]
RECORD at 383, 386
3
STEPHEN G HOMER
AT!Ol<NEY t,.f LAN

TABLE OF·AUTHORITIES
cases
Berry by and through Berry vs Beech Aircraft
Corporation,
717 P.2nd 670 (Utah Supreme Court 1985) 62, 63, 64, 66
Celebrity Club Inc. vs Utah Liquor Control Commission,
657 P.2d 1293 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) . . . . . . 44
Currier vs Holden,
862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993)
certiorari denied 870 P.2d 957 . . . . . . . . 65, 66
Dairy Produce Services, Inc. vs City of Wellsville,
2000 UT 81, 13 P.3d 581 (Utah Supreme ~ourt 2000)

. 43

Day vs State ex rel Utah Department of Public Safety,
1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah Supreme Court 1999)
. . . . . . . .
65, 66
Foote vs Utah Board of Pardons,
808 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1991) . . .

60, 61, 62, 66, 69, 70

Hailing vs Industrial Commission of Utah,
71 Utah 112, 263 Pac. 78 (Utah Supreme Court 1927). 44
Horton vs Goldminer's Daughter,
785 P.2d 1087 (Utah Supreme Court 1989) 63, 64, 65, 66
Howell vs Howell,
806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993)

8

Jacobsen Investment Company vs State Tax Commission,
839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992).

8

Jones vs Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,
94 P.3d 283 (Utah Supreme Court 2004)
. . . . 11, 58
Julian vs State,
966 P.2d 249 (Utah Supreme Court 1998)

. .

.

65, 66
4v

Lee vs Gaufin,
867 P.2d 572 (Utah Supreme Court 1993)
Maxfield vs Herbert, 2012 UT 44,
284 P.3d 647 (Utah Supreme Court 2012)

. . . .

66
11, 58

Miller vs USAA Casualty Insurance Co.,
2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663 (Utah Supreme Court 2002) . . 43
4
STEPHEN G HOMER
ATTORNEY AT LAW

Morris vs Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167,
321 P.2d 644 (Utah Supreme Court 1958) .
. ...

44

Nelson vs Jacobsen,
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah Supreme Court 1983)

44

Peterson vs Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,
48 P.3d 941 {Utah Supreme Court 2002)
Salt

.

11, 58

Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc.
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017 {Utah Supreme Court 1995)

State VS Pena, [S/R]
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah Supreme Court 1994) . . .

vs
7
8

Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Incorporated vs Herm
Hughes & Son, Incorporated,
782 P.d 188 {Utah Supreme Court 1989)
. . 65, 66
The State of Utah, Petitioner vs Claudia Laycock, Judge,
2009 UT 53, 214 P.3d 104 (Utah Supreme Court 2009). 29
United Park City Mines Co. vs Greater Park City Company,
870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993)
8
Wells vs Children's Aid Society of Utah,
681 P.2d 199 (Utah Supreme Court 1984) . . .

43, 44

Young Electric Sign Company, Inc. vs State ex rel
UDOT, 2005 UT App 169, 110 P.3d 1118 (Utah Court
of Appeals 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8
Utah Constitution

'-iJ

Article I

I

Section 7

Article I

I

Section 11 .

Article VIII, Section 1

. . . . . .

42, 61

11, 13, 22, 57, 59, 61

.

. .

Article VIII, Section 5

23
23

5
STEPHEN G HOMER

Utah statutes
77-18a-1 (6) (b)

38

77-27-3, Utah Code

26

77-27-5, Utah Code [procedure]
9, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22
34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 50, 67, 68
77-27-5(3), Utah Code

13, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 69

77-27-6, Utah Code

21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 42, 45, 46 / 47

.

. .

77-38a-101 et seq, Utah Code

26

10, 13, 21, 47, 48

77-38a-102(6)
77-38a-203 (2) (d)

38

77-38a-401, Utah Code

26, 27

78-12-28, Utah Code [repealed 2008)

46, 49

78A-5-102, Utah Code

. . . .

23

78B-2-304, Utah Code [enacted 2008)

9, 14, 21, 46 / 4 9, 68

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

78B-5-825, Utah Code

70

Administrative Regulations
Administrative Regulation R871-403.2 Restitution

.

. . 42

Rules
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 20, 26, 30, 60, 67
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

6
STEPHEN G HOMER
1>TTORNEY ll.T t.t.11'

30

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

This

II

appeal II of a decision of the Third District Court

is to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction in
accordance with Section 78A-4-103(e), Utah Code

[appeals

from non-capital "criminal" cases], even though this appeal
effectively involves the "civil judgment" entered by reason
of the "jurisdiction" statutorily-granted to the District
Court to do so.
The Utah Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction
to rule upon the "unconstitutionality of statute" presented
to the District Court and also raised in this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

This

appeal

(and

the

predicate

factual

situation

surrounding it) presents the following issues for review:
1.
the

The District Court erred in its ruling that
court

had

Defendant's

"set

"no

jurisdiction"

aside"

motion

to

review

involving

the

"civil judgment" arising from the filing of the
Board's 24 September 2013 "order of restitution".
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW:

Where

the

issue

involves

interpretation and application of a statute, the
appellate

court

deference

but

grants

the

reviews

the

trial

court

conclusion

no
for

correctness. Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy
Clinic,

Inc.

vs Frederick,

890 P.2d 1017

(Utah

Supreme Court 1995); Young Electric Sign Company,
Inc.

VS

State ex rel UDOT,
7
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2005 UT App 169, 110

P.3d 1118

(Utah Court of Appeals 2005). A trial

court's conclusions of law in civil casesFOOTNOTE 1
are reviewed for correctness.

United Park City

Mines Company vs Greater Park City Company,

P.2d 880,

885

(Utah Supreme Court 1993).

870
This

standard of review has also been referred to as a
of

"correction

error

Jacobsen

standard".

Investment Company vs State Tax Commission,

P.2d

789,

(Utah

790

Supreme

839

1992).

Court

"Correction of error" means that no particular
deference is given to the trial court's ruling on
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah Supreme Court
error"

19 94) .

The

"correction of

standard means that the appellate court

decides the matter for itself and does not defer
in any degree to the trial judge's determination
of law.

806

Howell vs Howell,

P. 2d 1209,

1211

(Utah Court of Appeals 1993).
PRESERVATION

OF

"jurisdiction"

of

aside"

the

filing

of

"civil
the

FOR

ISSUE
the

District

judgment"

APPEAL.
Court

to

"set

from

the

"Order

of

arising

Board-prepared

The

Although this "case" is actually a 11 criminal case", the
Defendant's "motions to set aside" the resultant "civil judgment"
against him by reason of the Board's defective "order of
restitution" are properly before the District Court. The
controlling statutes
[77-27-6 and 77-38a-402,
Utah Code]
expressly direct the Board to file its "restitution order" with
the sentencing court, which was the Third District Court and
Judge Skanchy.
1
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Restitution" was presented to the District Court
in DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, dated/filed 24 April 2014,
pages 5-10, RECORD at 296-301.
The Board's September 2013 "restitution order"

2.

is

invalid,

due

to

the

fact---admitted by the

Board---that the Board failed to conduct the "full
hearing"

(or any hearing, for that matter) on the

"restitution" issue,

as said "full hearing" was

expressly required by Section 77-27-5 (3),

Utah

Code. STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above.
PRESERVATION

OF

ISSUE

FOR

APPEAL.

Defendant's

arguments concerning the Board's failure to afford
him the statutorily-prescribed "full hearing" were
presented to the District Court in DEFENDANT'S
MOTION

TO

SET

ASIDE

CIVIL

STATUTORILY-REQUIRED

JUDGMENT

HEARING:

[LACK

OF

77-27-5],

dated/filed 11 June 2014, RECORD at 545-546, and
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SET ASIDE CIVIL JUDGMENT [LACK OF STATUTORILYREQUIRED

RESTITUTION

HEARING:

77-27-5],

dated/filed 11 June 2014, RECORD at 547-557.
3.

The Board's September 2013 "restitution order"

is invalid, due to the fact that the State's claim
for "restitution" would have time-barred by the 2year

statute

of

limitation

of

Section

78B-2-

304(2), Utah Code [for "wrongful death"] and the
9
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Board

was

statutorily-precluded

"restitution"
time-barred

for

from

"pecuniary damages"
in

losses,

accordance

provisions of Section 77-38a-102(6),
Thus,
order"

the

Board's

is,

in

awarding

September

essence,

statutorily-granted

2014

ultra

for

such

with

the

Utah Code.
"res ti tut ion

vires

authorities

and

of

the

its
civil

judgment resulting from the filing thereof should
be set aside.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above.
PRESERVATION
arguments
action

OF

ISSUE

FOR

APPEAL.

concerning the Board's

in

ordering

expenses"

already

"wrongful

death"

"ultra vires"

"restitution"
time-barred

statute

of

Defendant's

by

for

"funeral

the

limitation

2-year
were

presented to the District Court within DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL,

dated/filed 24 April 2014,

pages 19-27,

thereof. RECORD at 310-318.
4.

The Board's September 2013 "restitution order"

is invalid,

due to the fact that the September

2014 "restitution order"---the "order" which was
actually filed with the District Court and for
which

the

filing

thereof

creates

the

"civil

judgment" sought to be set aside---was not "made
within sixty days" of the Defendant's release from
prison,

as expressly required by Section 77-2710
STEPHEN G HOMER
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6(4), Utah Code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See #1, above.
PRESERVATION

OF

ISSUE

FOR APPEAL.

Defendant's

arguments concerning the Board's failure to afford
him the statutorily-prescribed "full hearing 11 were
presented to the District Court in DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE RESTITUTION ORDER, dated/filed 12 November
2013. RECORD at 131-135.
5.

The provisions of Section 77-27-5 (3),

Code

[administrative

restitution)
decisions
review 11 ]

(including

decisions

and orders of the Board of Pardons

are
is

Utah

not

subject

unconstitutional,

to

any

as

11

judicial

violative

of

Article I, Section 11 [ 11 open courts" provisions]
of the Utah Constitution.
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW:

See

#1,

above.

A

validly-

adopted statute is afforded a "strong presumption
of constitutionality".

See Maxfield vs Herbert,

2012 UT 44, 115, 284 P.3d 647 (Utah Supreme Court
2012); Peterson vs Coca-Cola USA,
23,

48 P.3d 941

2002 UT 42,

(Utah Supreme Court 2002).

1

The

challenging party has a "heavy burden" to show the
statute is unconstitutional.
Board of Pardons

P.3d 283

&

Parole,

See Jones vs Utah

2004 UT 53,

1 10, 94

(Utah Supreme Court 2004).

PRESERVATION

OF

ISSUE

FOR APPEAL.
11
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Defendant, s .

claims as to the "unconstitutionality" of Section
77-27-5 (3),

Utah

Code,

were

presented

to

the

District Court pursuant to and within DEFENDANT'S
MOTION

FOR

JUDICIAL

DETERMINATION

OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE [77-27-5 (3)],
dated/filed 21 April 2014. RECORD at 283-285. See
also "Defendant's Notification to Utah Attorney
General", dated 21 April 2014 [RECORD at 290-291]
and "Defendant's Memorandum in Support", dated 24
April 2014. RECORD 292-318.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[Subsection 77-27-6(4), Utah Code]
(4) If
the
defendant,
upon
termination or
expiration of sentence owes outstanding fines,
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days
after the termination or expiration of the
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred
to the district court for civil collection
remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall
forward a restitution order to the sentencing
court to be entered on the judgment docket. The
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
judgment.
[Points I' II]
[Subsection 77-27-5(1) (c), Utah Code]
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine,
forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole,
pardon,
or commutation granted or sentence
terminated, except after a full hearing before the
board or the board's appointed examiner in open
session. Any action taken under this subsection
other than by a majority of the board shall be
affirmed by a majority of the board.
[Point II]
[Subsection 77-27-6(2) (b), Utah Code]
(2) (b)
In accordance with Section 77-38a302(5) (d) (ii),
the board may order that a
defendant make restitution for pecuniary damages
12
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that were not determined by the court, unless the
board applying the criteria as set forth in
Section 77-38a-302 determines that restitution is
inappropriate.
[Point III]
[Subsection 77-38a-102(6), Utah Code]
( 6) 11 Pecuniary damages II means all demonstrable
economic injury, whether or not incurred, which a
person could recover in a civil action arising out
of
the
facts
or
events
cons ti tu ting
the
defendant's criminal activities . . .
[Subsection 77-27-6(2) (c), Utah Code]
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (d), the
board shall make all orders of restitution within
60 days after the termination or expiration of the
defendant's sentence.
[Point IV]
[Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code]
( 3) Decisions of the board in cases involving
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines and
forfeitures are final and are not subject to
judicial review . . . .
[Point VJ
[Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial
and unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in the State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
[Point VJ
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

In March 2006 Defendant DENNIS J GARCIA was the driver

of a motor vehicle involved in a single-vehicle accident in
which his passenger Shane Buckley was killed.

Defendant

GARCIA was arrested at the scene and charged with Automobile
Homicide, a third-degree felony. RECORD at 1-3.
2.

On 25 February 2008 Gail Buckley, the court-appointed
13
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Personal

Representative

of

the

Estate

of

Thomas

Shane

Buckley, Deceased filed a district court lawsuit [Civil No.
080903244]

against

related expenses

GARCIA

for

"wrongful

death"

incurred in the March 2006

and/or

automobile

accident and related events which gave rise to the criminal
charges against GARCIA. FOOTNOTE 2 The civil case was defended
by

private

attorneys

hired

by

the

liability

insurance

carrier for the GARCIA-owned motor vehicle involved in the
accident.

Eventually, Gail Buckley in her individual and

official Personal Representative capacity settled with the
insurance carrier and received the sum of $25, 000---the
"policy limits"---for the claim of loss, in behalf of the
estate and the heirs. GARCIA was unaware whether the State
of Utah or any of its agencies---except for UDOT, which was
paid on a

"property damage"

claim---made claim upon the

"estate" of the deceased. Gail Buckley in her individual and
official Personal Representative capacities signed a twopage "General Release and Settlement Document"

[RECORD at

365-367; ATTACHMENT 7 to this BRIEF], by which all claims
against GARCIA (and his insurance company) would be released

The Buckley-filed, on 25 February 2008, 11 wrongful
death litigation was timely, as being before the expiration
of the applicable 2-year statute of limitation therefor.
[Section 78B-2-304(2), Utah Code.] The Buckley complaint
pleaded only Mrs Buckley---albeit in her individual and
"personal representative" capacities---as the Plaintiff
therein.
Neither the Utah Office for Crime Victims
Reparations [ 11 CVR 11 ] nor any other Utah governmental agency
was pleaded as a party therein, nor was the CVR's $7,000
reimbursement to her expressly identified as such.
2

II

14
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and forever discharged. GARCIA was generally unaware of the
disposition of claims made or which should have been made
within the "probate case"
Buckley.

of the deceased,

Thomas Shane

See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November

1

2013,
3.

8, RECORD at 128-129.

On 17 April

Defendant

GARCIA

2008,
was

following
convicted

a
of

one-day jury trial,
the

charged

felony

offense. Following that conviction, GARCIA was immediately
ordered into custody pending sentencing. See AFFIDAVIT OF
DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 1 2. RECORD at 127.
4.

On 2 June 2008 GARCIA was sentenced by the trial judge

(the Honorable Randall N Skanchy of
Court)
five

the Third District

to serve an indeterminate sentence, not exceeding

years

incarceration.

GARCIA would be

Judge

"given credit

Skanchy announced that

the

Skanchy announced
for

time

"restitution"

served".
would be

that
Judge
left

"open"; no restitution was ordered at time of sentencing.
See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION,

dated 7 November 2013,

1 3.

RECORD at 127.
5.

No

"restitution"

was ordered by the District Court

within one year of sentencing. In fact, no "res ti tut ion 11 -

-

-

of any kind and in any amount---has, to my knowledge, ever
been ordered by the District Court. GARCIA was never been
notified of any District Court
15
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"restitution" hearing or

proceeding, was never been given opportunity to participate
in any such proceeding, nor did GARCIA knowingly waive his
rights

to

be

notified

of

and/or

participate

in

such

proceedings. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION, dated 7 November
2013, 1 4, RECORD at 127.
6.

GARCIA

served

incarceration,

a

five-year

without

interruption:

(following the jury conviction)
April

2013

from

the

period

Utah

of

continuous

from 17 April 2008

until his release on 15

State

Prison,

upon

full

and

complete expiration of the Court-imposed sentence. At the
time

of

GARCIA'S

release

from

prison

on

the

herein-

referenced felony conviction, he had no other "charges" or
convictions against him for which the Utah Department of
Corrections had jurisdiction over him or for which he was
being held or serving "time".
GARCIA

IN

SUPPORT

OF

See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J

MOTION

TO

RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013,
7.

SET

1

ASIDE

ORDER

OF

5, RECORD at 127-128.

During his five-year period of incarceration at the

Utah State Prison and up to just weeks before his release
from prison, GARCIA routinely checked through the "NORMS"
database---a service regularly provided to inmates---as to
whether

there

were

any

unpaid

fines,

"restitution"

or

similar unresolved claims or holds against me: there were
none.

[See ATTACHMENT 11 to this BRIEF.]

written

account

statements

always

His bi-monthly

reflected

a

"$0.00 11

balance for any "restitution" to be paid. See AFFIDAVIT OF
16
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DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF
RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013,
8.

1

6, RECORD at 128.

During his five-year incarceration at the Utah State

Prison and up to and through his release from incarceration
(in

April

2013),

GARCIA

"restitution" hearing

was

never

notified

of

any

(to be held by the Third District

Court or the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole), was never
invited to participate in such a hearing (in either forum),
did not participate in such a hearing, and never knowingly
waived his

right

to participate in such a

hearing.

See

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION,

dated 7 November 2013,

1

7,

RECORD at 128.
9.

Actions (and/or inaction) undertaken by GARCIA and by

his liability insurance carrier were in reasonable and good
faith reliance upon the efficacy of the "General Release and
Settlement Document" signed by Gail Buckley in her official
Personal Representative capacity. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J
GARCIA

IN

RESTITUTION,

SUPPORT

OF

MOTION

TO

dated 7 November 2013,

SET

1

ASIDE
9,

ORDER

OF

RECORD at 129;

ATTACHMENT 7 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

10.

GARCIA was given no notice of any "restitution hearing"

ostensibly held by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole
prior to or subsequent to or as a condition of his April
2013 release from incarceration. GARCIA did not participate
in any such hearing and he did not knowingly waive his right
to participate in any such hearing, at any time or place.
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See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION,

dated 7 November 2013,

1 10,

RECORD at 129-130.
11.

Until GARCIA received (in late-October 2013)

written

correspondence from the Utah Office of Debt Collection as to
a claimed $9,000+

11

debt 11

,

claimed-to-be owed by him to the

State, GARCIA was unaware of any such claimed "debt" or his
liability for payment thereof.
GARCIA

IN

SUPPORT

OF

See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J

MOTION

TO

SET

ASIDE

ORDER

OF

RESTITUTION, dated 7 November 2013, 111, RECORD at 129-130.
12.

On 15 April 2013 Defendant GARCIA was released from the

Utah

State

Prison,

his

5-year

sentence

for

the

felony

conviction having expired. See AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J GARCIA
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF RESTITUTION,

1 3, RECORD at 127.

dated 7 November 2013,
13.

On or about 24 September 2013 the Honorable Clark A

Harms,

Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole

prepared and signed,

in behalf of the Board,

"ORDER OF RESTITUTION".

a one-page

The "ORDER" was forwarded to and

received by the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County and "entered" on the "judgment
docket" about 11 October 2013. RECORD at 119.

[ATTACHMENT 1

to this BRIEF]
14.

On 8 November 2013 GARCIA filed his "set aside" motion.

RECORD at 122-125.
15.

On

PAROLE,

13

January

2014

the

UTAH BOARD OF

PARDONS

AND

represented by Assistant Attorney General Sharel
18
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Reber, and the UTAH OFFICE OF DEBT COLLECTION, represented
by Assistant Attorney General Amanda Jex, orally petitioned
the Third District Court for voluntary "intervention", as
claimed

"real-parties-in-interest,

in the case.

The two

state agencies' petitions were granted by the District Court
and the

entities

have

continuously participated in the

"civil judgment" proceedings thereafter. See RECORD at 155218 [Board's "OPPOSITION" memorandum, dated 6 February 2014,
with extensive attachments] and RECORD 221-275 [Utah Office
of Debt Collection's "CONTRA MEMORANDUM", dated 13 February
2014, with extensive attachments].
16.

In

Randall

April
N

2014

the

District

Skanchy- - -ruled

the

Court---the

District

Honorable

Court

had

II

no

jurisdiction" to set aside the "civil judgment" arising from
the filing of the Board-filed "order of restitution". RECORD
at 279-282.

[ATTACHMENT 2 to this BRIEF] The Defendant made

timely (within 10 days) "motion for new trial", in addition
to other related motions, including a claim for the judicial
determination of the unconstitutionality of the provisions
of Section 77-27-5 (3), Utah Code (purporting to prohibit any
judicial review of Board of Pardons decisions). RECORD at
284-285.
17.

On

28

August

2014

"memorandum decision"

the

District

Court

issued

its

[RECORD at 593-596; ATTACHMENT 3 to

this BRIEF] denying the Defendant's motions (for new trial,
and so forth), but did not sign the actual Court-directed
but Board:..prepared "ORDER OF THE COURT" until over a month
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later (29 September 2014). RECORD at 604-607 [ATTACHMENT 4
to this BRIEF.]
18.

On 25 October 2014 the Defendant DENNIS J GARCIA filed

his "Notice of Appeal". RECORD at 611-612.
SUMMARIES OF ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

1.

The District Court erred in its ruling that the court

had "no jurisdiction"

to review Defendant's

motion

"restitution

involving

the

order"

"set aside"
and/or,

more

specifically, the resultant "civil judgment" arising from
the filing thereof. The two statutes expressly applicable to
the "making" of a "restitution order" by the Parole Board
additionally direct the filing thereof with the District
Court, as the "sentencing court" of the underlying felony
criminal case, from which the Board (upon incarceration in
the state prison) has jurisdiction over the individual. That
"filing"

(of the

"restitution order")

statutorily prescribed---of
against

the

Defendant.

creating a

However,

has the effect- - "civil

those

same

judgment"
statutes

expressly provide that the "civil judgment" so created is
"subject to ·the same rules as a judgment for money in a
civil judgment". The "civil judgment" thus entered is not,
per se, tied to the "sentencing" function of the District
Court as part of the original criminal conviction; rather,
the Board's filing of its "restitution order" has the effect
of reinvesting the District Court with "civil jurisdiction",
which includes the Rule 60(b) remedies to "set aside" the
"civil judgment".
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2.

The

Board's

September

2013

"restitution

order"

is

invalid, due to the fact---admitted by the Board---that the
Board failed to conduct the "full hearing" (or any hearing,
for that matter) on the "restitution" issue, as said "full
hearing" was expressly required by Section 77-27-5 (3), Utah
Code.

The excuses advanced by the Board to justify its

failure

to

hold

the

"restitution hearing"---namely,

an

unsubstantiated, undocumented and unproved "waiver" of his
right to the

II

full hearing" - - -are legally and factually

unavailing to the Board.
3 .

The

invalid,

Board's
due

to

September

2013

"restitution

order"

the

that

the

claim

fact

State 1 s

is
for

"restitution" would have time-barred by the 2-year statute
of

limitation

of

Section

78B-2-304 (2),

Utah

Code

[for

"wrongful death"] and the Board was statutorily-precluded
from awarding "restitution" for "pecuniary damages" for such
time-barred losses,
Section

in accordance with the provisions of

77-38a-102(6),

Utah

Code.

Thus,

September 2014 "restitution order" is,
vires of

the

Board's

in essence, ultra

its statutorily-granted aut~orities;

the civil

judgment resulting from the filing thereof should be set
aside.
4 .

The

invalid,

Board's
due

to

September
the

2013

fact

"restitution

that

the

order"

September

is

2014

"restitution order"---the "order" which was actually filed
with the District Court and for which the filing thereof
creates the "civil judgment" sought to be set aside---was
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not "made within sixty days" of the Defendant's release from
prison, as required by Section 77-27-6(4), Utah Code.
5.

The

provisions

of

Section

77-27-5(3),

Utah

Code

[administrative decisions (including restitution) and orders
of the Board of Pardons decisions are not subject to any
judicial

review]

is

unconstitutional,

as

violative

of

Article I, Section 11 ["open courts" provisions] of the Utah
Constitution. The statutory terms---expressly prohibiting
any and all "judicial review" of Board decisions---are clear
on

their

face

and

are

incapable

of

any

reasonable

interpretation which avoids the unconstitutional result.
That the Utah Supreme Court in previous cases has avoided
addressing the obvious "unconstitutionality" of Section 7727-5 (3) - - -because the Supreme Court in those cases was not
requested to do so---is no reason for this appellate court
to refuse the claims of this Defendant, who certainly has
"standing" to raise this issue.
ARGUMENT
I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS
THAT THE COURT HAD 11 NO JURISDICTION"
AND RULE UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" RESULTING
THE FILING AND ENTRY OF THE "ORDER OF

RULING
TO CONSIDER
"SET ASIDE"
FROM
RESTITUTION"

Attempting to avoid having the District Court
aside"

its

24

September

2013

"Order

of

"set

Restitution",

Intervenor UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS [hereinafter "the BOARD" or
simply "the Board"] argued [RECORD at 158] and the District
Court agreed and ruled [RECORD at 279-282 (11 April 2014),
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RECORD 59?-595 (Memorandum Decision and Order": 21 August
2014)

and RECORD at

604-608

2014)] that the Court had

11

(Court Order:

29

September

no jurisdiction" to consider and

grant Defendant's "set aside" motion. [Photocopies of these
District Court rulings are attached hereto as addenda to
this APPELLANT'S BRIEF: ATTACHMENT No. 2, ATTACHMENT No. 3
and ATTACHMENT No.

4,

respectively.]

The District Court

erred in its "no jurisdiction" rulings.
A

Article
··\iii)

VIII,

Section 1

of

the Utah

Constitution,

provides in relevant part:
The judicial power of the
vested in a supreme court, in a
general jurisdiction known as the
and in such other courts as the
statute may establish.

state shall be
trial court of
district court,
Legislature by

Emphasis added.
Article

VIII,

Section

5

of

the

Utah Constitution,

pertaining to the "jurisdiction of the District Court",
provides in relevant part:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to
issue all extraordinary writs . . . .
Emphasis added.
The foregoing

II

constitutional II

provisions have been

incorporated into statute, codified at Section 78A-5-102,
Utah Code, which provides in relevant part:
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
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Emphasis added.
The "jurisdiction" in the instant situation arises and
is authoritatively controlled by Subsection 77-27-6 (4), Utah
Code,

pertaining

to

the

Board's

authority

to

"order

restitution" by a person under its control. Subsection 7727-6(4) provides in its entirety:
(4)
If
the
defendant,
upon
termination or
expiration of sentence owes outstanding fines,
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days
after the termination or expiration of the
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred
to the district court for civil collection
remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall
forward a restitution order to the sentencing
court to be entered on the judgment docket. The
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
judgment.

Emphasis added.
The first sentence will be analyzed in greater detail
in Point IV of this APPELLANT'S BRIEF [pp. 46-51], but the
closing phrase "the matter shall be referred to the district
court

for

civil

collection

remedies"

while

initially

appearing to be perhaps somewhat vague (ala "referred to the
district

court"

deliberate

and

thought

investiture of

11

"for

civil

proves

collection

otherwise:

a

remedies") ,
legislative

jurisdiction 11 ---namely "civil" jurisdiction-

--to the District Court. Correspondingly, there could be no
"civil collection remedies" if there were not some kind of
"jurisdiction" for the District Court to first enter some
kind of

"judgment" to be collected upon by the affected

claimant.
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That a

11

judgment 11 ---for which "jurisdiction" of some

kind is a fundamental conceptual prerequisite---will arise
is made clear by the final two sentences of Subsection 7727-6(4), thus:

. . . The Board of Pardons and Parole shall
forward a restitution order to the sentencing
court to be entered on the judgment docket. The
entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
judgment.
Emphasis added. The phrase "forward a restitution order to
the sentencing court to be entered on the judgment docket"
is

significant:

the

text

confirms

the

Legislature's

investiture of "jurisdiction" to "enter" the "restitution
order" on the District Court's "judgment docket". The second
sentence---namely
The entry
[of the Board-prepared "order of
restitution" upon the judgment docket]
shall
constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil judgment.
[Bracketed text added for clarity]
---is even more clear as to the legislative intent: the thus
"entered" order of restitution "is subject to the same rules
as a

judgment for money in a civil

added.

[While

the

phrase

"shall

judgment".

constitute

a

Emphasis
lien"

is

arguably confusing in the traditional "lien" sense of that
word, the "judgment" term---utilized twice---is absolutely
clear.] It is this "civil judgment" terminology which gives
rise

to

the

Defendant's

usage

of

that

terminology

to

describe the object of his "set aside" motion.
The closing phrase---pertaining to the "entry" of the
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Board's "order of restitution" upon the District Court's
"judgment

docket"---"and

is

subject

to

the

same

rules"

applies not only to the rules pertaining to the "collection"
of the "civil judgment 11
those

11

,

but must also encompass and include

rules 11 ---for example, Rule 60 (b) ---providing for the

"setting aside"

of the former

"judgment"

in appropriate

cases. FOOTNOTE 3

The provisions of the Utah "Crime Victims Restitution
Act", codified at Section 77-38a-101 et seq, Utah Code, are
supportive of the foregoing analysis. Although most of the
provisions

of

the

Crime

Victims

Restitution

Act

generally applicable only to the sentencing court,
narrowly-drawn

and

specifically-referenced

are

a few

procedural

provisions are expressly made applicable to Board-ordered
11

restitution 11 matters, as per Sections 77-27-3 and 77-27-5,

applicable to the Board.

Subsection 77-38a-401 (4),

Code, also applicable to the situation, describes the

Utah
11

civil

judgment" as follows:

3
The Defendant's simultaneously-filed Rule 60 (b) (6)
motion to "set aside" the "civil judgment" is authorized and
meritorious under that Rule, which provides:
. . On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:

(6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
Emphasis added.
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A judgment ordering restitution, . . . is subject
to the same rules as a judgment in a civil action.
Emphasis added.
B

Judge

Skanchy' s

"no

jurisdiction"

ruling

is

seems

confused and inconsistent. In his 11 April 2014 "MEMORANDUM
DECISION"

ruling upon

Defendant's

original

"set

aside"

motion, Judge Skanchy wrote:
Utah
Code
Ann. ,
Subsection
( 5) ( d) (ii) ,
provides that" [a]ny pecuniary damages that have
not been determined by the court within one year
after sentencing may be determined by the Board of
Pardons and Parole." Utah courts have long
recognized that "Once a court imposes a valid
sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction
over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,
679 (Utah App. 1991); State V. Vaughn, 2011 UT App
411, ~ 11, 266 P. 3d 202. This Court entered a
valid sentence in this case, and thereby lost
subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, once the
one-year period after sentencing expired, this
Court also lost jurisdiction over Mr. Garcia's
restitution obligation. Jurisdiction moved to the
Board to determine restitution owed.
The Court hereby concludes that it lacks
jurisdiction to set aside the Board's claim for
restitution against Mr. Garcia. The Board's claim
is not subject to judicial review by this Court.
The Court imposed a prison sentence on June 2,
2008, thereby losing subject matter jurisdiction.
Once the one-year period after sentencing by this
Court expired, the Court further lost jurisdiction
over
Mr.
Garcia's
restitution
obligation.
Jurisdiction moved to the Board at the expiration
of the Court's jurisdiction over restitution.
Accordingly, Mr. Garcia's Motion to Set Aside
Restitution is denied.
Emphasis added. Pages 3 - 4 of District Court "MEMORANDUM
DECISION". RECORD at 281-282. Copy thereof at ATTACHMENT 2
in the Addenda to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
As can be seen from the foregoing quoted material, the
District Court [Judge Skanchy] misapprehended and/or failed
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to

consider

the

applicable

statutes

(and/or

Defendant

GARCIA'S arguments thereon): that under Section 77-27-6(4)
the District

Court

lS

jurisdiction", even
11

11

REINVESTED

(or

reinstated)

"with

civil 11 jurisdiction. That REINSTATED

jurisdiction 11 arises pursuant to the Board's "refer [ring)"

its

restitution order" for " entry on the [Court's] judgment

11

docket",

which essentially creates

herein sought to be "set aside''.
2 7 - 6 ( 4) ;

the

"civil

judgment"

[Quoted terms are from 77-

bracketed term added for

clarity. ]

It

is

that

REINSTATED "jurisdiction 11 which the District Court could
have and should have exercised.
The District Court's
judgment 11 arising from the
the Board - prepared

11

II

jurisdiction II

11

ref erring" and

II

11

"civil

forwarding" of

restitution order" and its "entry" is

not tied to or part of the court's
The

over the

11

sentencing 11 function .

civil judgment 11 issues described by and arising under

the Section 77-27 - 6 (4) -identified processes and events have
nothing to do with "sentencing" and/or

11

restitution 11 which

might have been initially associated therewith.
[Judge Skanchy's statement (i.e. 11 The Board's claim is
not subject to judicial review by this Court.
within

the

second

paragraph

quoted

11 )

above

contained

raises

the

"unconstitutionality of statute 11 issue described in Point V
of this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.)
Notwithstanding whatever the Judge Skanchy-referenced
11

cases 11

[Montoya and Vaughn] may have held (or even stated

in dicta ) as to the criminal court generally
28
STEPHEN G HOMER

11

losing 11 its

"jurisdiction" upon sentencing, those cases did not decide
the statutory reinvestiture of "jurisdiction" for these
"restitution" matters at issue in this situation.
Judge Skanchy' s "district court loses jurisdiction upon
sentencing"

analysis

and

conclusion

internally-

is

inconsistent and flawed. Judge Skanchy expressly recognizes
the statutory "one year" extension (or retention) of the
Court's "jurisdiction" so as to order "restitution". See
Subsection 7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 0 2 ( 5 ) ( d) ( i ) AND 7 7 - 3 8A- 3 0 2 ( 5 ) ( d) ( ii ) .
Those provisions constitute a statutory exception to the
"court loses jurisdiction upon sentencing" general rule.
Likewise, the reinstatement of "civil jurisdiction" pursuant
to Subsection 77-27-6(4) is a similar statutory exception.
For

the

proposition

that

a

sentencing

court

has

statutory "jurisdiction" to enter court-ordered restitution
even beyond the "one year" following sentencing, see The
State of Utah, Petitioner, vs Claudia Laycock, Judge, 2009

UT 53, 214 P.3d 103 (Utah Supreme Court 2009).
The Board's arguments---that the District Court has "no
jurisdiction" to set aside the "entered" restitution order--are disingenuous and flawed, for a variety of reasons:
1.

The Board filed ("forwarded") the "order of

restitution" to the District Court, in procedural
compliance with the statute: for the purpose of
creating the "civil judgment" it seeks to take
advantage of. The Board cannot now to be heard to
claim

that

the

District
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Court

"has

no

jurisdiction" to enter the
Board's

2.

(and/or

"filing"

"refer [ing]

11

11

judgment 11 which the
"forward[ing]

11

and

successfully brought into existence.

The Board's assertion that Defendant GARCIA is

limited

to

a

Rule

6 5B

"extraordinary

relief 11

remedy against the Parole Board [under subsection
D(2) of the Rule]

is disingenuous and flawed. If

the District Court has "jurisdiction" to entertain
a

Rule

65B

claim,

the

District

Court

has

"jurisdiction" for a Rule 60 motion. Neither Rule
65B nor Rule 60 expressly purports to create or
grant "jurisdiction" to the District Court; both
rules recognize the "jurisdiction" the District
Court already possesses.FOOTNOTE 4
The "no jurisdiction" argument of the Board and of the
Utah Office of Debt Collection---ostensibly made for the

Any "new" Rule 65B proceeding filed anew against the
Parole Board would at best be suited to judicially mandate
the Board to do something:
i.e.
actually hold the
"restitution hearing" the Board neglected to hold in 2010
(or any other time) . As the Defendant has long been released
from Board custody, the Board has no statutory authority to
hold such a hearing, even pursuant to judicial directive.
The Court would not order the Board to do something the
Board was statutorily unable to do.
Similarly, Rule 65B "extraordinary relief" (to hold a
hearing??) would not necessarily "set aside" the previouslyentered "civil judgment", entered in favor of the Utah
Office for Victims of Crime. If such a result were
contemplated and authorized pursuant to Rule 65B and the
District Court had jurisdiction, the District Court would
already have "jurisdiction" to "set aside" under Rule 60 (b).
4

30
STEPHEN G HOMER
l,

rTORNEY t. I

L"- Ill'

short-term

purpose

of

avoiding

judicial

scrutiny

of

Defendant's "set aside" claims---and the District Court's
acceptance of the argument is illogical and will prove to be
misguided

and

self-defeating

District Court has
Court

cannot

ascertain
judgment 11

long-run:

assets

the District

IF

the

then the District

"supplementary

defendant's

Likewise,

jurisdiction"

the

no jurisdiction",

conduct

the
•

11

in

to

proceedings"
pay

the

"civil

Court would have

to issue a writ of garnishment

to

"no

(for wages

and/or for bank accounts)

or a writ of execution

(other

property)

sell,

"civil

to

seize

and

to

satisfy

the

judgment". The "civil judgment"---except for the personal
inconvenience and detriment experienced by the defendant for
injury to his "credit rating" and the consequential damage
to

employment

meaningless,

and housing

opportunities- - -has

"judicial nullity",

incapable

of

become

a

effective

enforcement. This result---of "no jurisdiction" to pursue
these

identified

post-judgment

remedies- - -would

be

the

situation not only for Defendant GARCIA in this case, but
for ALL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS statewide, in all Board-ordered
"restitution" cases---a result the Legislature certainly has
not intended.
Pursuant to the foregoing statutes, the District Court--as

"the

sentencing

court"

to

which

the

"order

of

restitution" has been "referred" and has been "entered on
the judgment docket" - - - is invested with "civil jurisdiction 11
over the "restitution order"

(and, more particularly, the
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resulting "civil judgment") which arises from the

11

entry 11

thereof. This conferring of "civil jurisdiction'', arising
from

the

foregoing

statutes,

exists

and

continues

irrespective of and unrelated to the Court's long-expired
authority to "order" that "restitution" be paid as part of
the criminal sentence imposed against a convicted defendant.
The District Court DOES HAVE "jurisdiction" to consider
the Defendant's
jurisdiction"

II

set aside" motion. The District Court's "no

rulings are clearly in error and must be

reversed.FOOTNOTE 5
II

THE BOARD'S ACKNOWLEDGED FAILURE
TO CONDUCT A "FULL HEARING"
CONCERNING THE "RESTITUTION"
TO BE ORDERED AGAINST DEFENDANT
INVALIDATES THE BOARD-MADE "ORDER OF RESTITUTION",
ITSELF VOID AB INITIO, WHICH RENDERS
DEFECTIVE, INEFFECTIVE AND ILLEGAL
THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" WHICH SHOULD BE SET ASIDE

Early in the post-incarceration litigation process, the
Board readily acknowledged [RECORD at pages 217-218] that NO
"restitution hearing 11

was ever held by it prior to its

"ordering" Defendant GARCIA to pay "restitution". See, for

The Court of Appeals should proceed to decide each
of the following- - -Points II through IV, of this APPELLANT'S
BRIEF- - - issues, previously presented to the District Court.
The Court of Appeals decision should be "on-the-merits"
thereof. Defendant GARCIA- - -constantly facing" execution" of
or a "writ of garnishment" under the "civil judgment" (for
$ 7, OOO) , and/ or the adverse impact upon his II credit report"
and potential employment and housing opportunities---ought
not to have to wait for two more years on his "set aside"
motion, while under those adverse burdens which should have
never arisen.
5
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example, Board-filed DECLARATION OF GREG JOHNSON, dated and
filed February 2014 (as an· 11 exhibit 11 to Board's OPPOSITION
TO "DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SET ASIDE RESTITUTION ORDER" memorandum), dated 6 February
2014. [RECORD AT 155-167] Therein, the Board's

11

witness"---

Board Administrative Coordinator Greg Johnson---stated, in
relevant part:
5.
Even though it is the Board's practice to use
the recommended restitution amount included in
Presentence Investigation Reports as the amount
for Board ordered restitution, if an offender
notifies the Board that he wants to contest that
restitution, the Board would hold a restitution
hearing.
9.
Nothing in Mr. Garcia's Board file indicates,
in the five (5) years he was under the Board's
jurisdiction, that he ever asked for a restitution
hearing, or raised the issue of restitution in any
communication with the Board, until his attorney's
December 23, 2013, GRAMA requests concerning
restitution.

DECLARATION OF GREG JOHNSON, dated 6 February 2014. RECORD
at 217-218. Emphasis added.
The

Johnson

"declaration"

is

significant:

the

statements in Paragraph 5 imply that it is (was) the Board's
regular practice to NOT hold the

"res ti tut ion hearing",

unless the prisoner "asked" for it.
The

Board's

failure

(to

conduct

the

"restitution

hearing") was correspondingly acknowledged by the Board's
counsel (Assistant AG Reber) when she- - -attempting to excuse
and/or explain the Board's failure to hold the restitution
hearing---wrote:
As to a res ti tut ion hearing, there was no need
for a hearing because Defendant had already waived
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his right to contest the accuracy of the $7000
amount.
The Board ordered the exact amount
recommended
in
Defendant's
Presentence
Investigation Report, an amount Defendant failed
to contest at sentencing, thereby waiving his
right to subsequently do so.

Emphasis added. Page 7, Board's OPPOSITION TO "DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE
RESTITUTION ORDER memorandum, dated 6 February 2014. [RECORD
at 161]
Later in the

litigation---but within this

same

"no

hearing held" context- - -Assistant Attorney General Reber was
to write:
"His failure to object there [in the District
Court, at sentencing] waived any future challenge,
which in turn negated any requirement for the
Board to hold a restitution hearing, . . . " [p. 3
of Board motion]
Defendant was provided all the due process he
was entitled to in his criminal case as to his
restitution obligation. [page 4 of Board motion]
Emphasis added. Pages 3-4, Board's MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" [LACK OF
STATUTORILY-REQUIRED HEARING: 77-27-5], dated 16 June 2014
[hereinafter "Board's STRIKE MOTION"], RECORD at 560-565;
quoted paragraphs are at RECORD 562 and 563.
The

"Order

of

Restitution"---"made"

and

thereafter

filed by the Board in September 2013---is void ab initio and
without legal effect for the reason that the Board-prepared
"Order"

was made without

the statutorily-required "full

hearing" (or any "hearing", for that matter), as required by
Section 77-27-5(1) (c), Utah Code, as a pre-condition to the
entry of

the

restitution

"order".

judgment"

arising automatically

The

resulting

from the

filing

"civil
of

the

invalid (but nevertheless "filed") "Order of Restitution" is
correspondingly itself invalid and must be set aside.
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A

A "FULL HEARING" MUST BE HELD BEFORE THE BOARD
MAY "ORDER" THE DEFENDANT TO PAY "RESTITUTION"

The

Board's

authority

to

"order"

an

incarcerated

prisoner to pay "restitution" is controlled---and limited--by

statute.

Section

77-27-5 (1) (c),

Utah

Code---in

the

Chapter applicable to the Board of Pardons- - -provides in its
entirety:
( c) No res ti tu tion may be ordered, no fine,
forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole,
pardon,
or commutation granted or sentence
terminated, except after a full hearing before the
board or the board's appointed examiner in open
session. Any action taken under this subsection
other than by a majority of the board shall be
affirmed by a majority of the board.
Emphasis added.
The statutory requirement--"No restitution may be ordered . . . except after
a full hearing . . . " [Emphasis added]

- - - is clear and unambiguous. The statutory text is incapable
of any other interpretation: a "full hearing" is REQUIRED to
be held BEFORE "restitution" may be ordered. Indeed, this
text

is

not

merely

a

requirement,

but

is

an

actual

LIMITATION, as evidenced by the language
"No restitution may be ordered .

. . except .

.

II

Emphasis added.
The statute [77-27-5(1) (c)J is clear and unambiguous.
The statute does not provide for any exceptions to its
requirements, nor for the limitation---i.e. "no restitution
may be ordered . . . except . . .
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11

-

-

-arising therefrom. The

statute

doesn't

place

the

burden

of

"asking

for"

a

"restitution hearing" upon the incarcerated prisoner; the
statutory burden

to

hold

the

singularly upon the Board.
"restitution",

the

"full

hearing"

is

placed

If the Board wants to impose

Board must

first

conduct

the

"full

hearing" on the issue. Only "after a full hearing" has been
conducted is the Board statutorily-authorized to "order" any
"restitution".
The Board's self-admitted failure to conduct a hearing- - let alone the statutorily-prescribed "full hearing" - - invalidates its "order of restitution". The "civil judgment"
arising automatically from the filing thereof is likewise
invalid and must be set aside.
B

THE BOARD'S "EXCUSES" FOR ITS FAILURE
TO HOLD ANY "RESTITUTION HEARING" ARE UNAVAILING
As documented above, the Board's disingenuous attempt
to justify its acknowledged failure to hold the statutorilyrequired "restitution hearing" on grounds, none of which is
identified or recognized in the controlling statute [77-275] :

1.

The Board claims that Defendant GARCIA never

requested a "restitution hearing" be held.
2.

The Board claims that Defendant GARCIA had

"waived" his right to a restitution hearing by
failing to
[June

2008]

"object"

to the pre- sentence report

statement

that
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the Utah Office

of

Crime Victim Reparations ["CVR"] had paid $7,000
for funeral expenses.
3.

The Board claims that Defendant GARCIA had

"waived"
amount,

his
thus

rights

to

waiving

object

his

right

to

the

to

a

$7,000
hearing

because the Board ordered that exact amount as
"restitution".
The Board's arguments---advanced as excuses for its failure
to hold the

II

full hearing" - - -are flawed,

inaccurate and

illusory, for numerous reasons, some of which are:
1.

Other

than

its

claimed,

self-serving

"Defendant waived" statements, the Board neither
identified nor produced

(or even suggested)

any

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE- - -testimonial or documentary- - that such a "waiver" actually occurred, let alone
was implied or consciously intended.

[Given that

"waiver" of a "constitutional right" (in this case
"procedural due process"

right to the hearing)

ought to be by clear and convincing evidence, of
a knowing and intentional result (ala waiver), the
Board's claimed "waiver" excuse is unavailing.]
2.

The

statutory scheme- - -particularly 77-27-

5) ( l) ( c) - - -clearly
obligation

to

imposed upon

hold

the

"full

the

Board

hearing"

as

the
a

prerequisite to Board-ordered "restitution". The
Defendant is not required to "ask for" a hearing,
and there is no statutory provision which even
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suggests such a requirement.
3.

Contrary t.o the Board's counsel's statement- - -

a material misstatement of fact intentionally made
to mislead a tribunal---that "restitution had been
recommended"

(paraphrased),

there simply was NO

RECOMMENDATION within the June 2006 "pre-sentence
report" as to any "restitution" to be "ordered".
4.

The

"pre-sentence

report"

did

contain

A

TRUTHFUL STATEMENT: that the Utah Office for Crime
Victims Reparation

["CVR"]

$7, 000

expenses.

as

funeral

asserted it had paid
The

statement

was

truthful on both counts: 1. The CVR Office made
the statement, and 2. The CVR Office did, in fact,
make the $7,000 payment.
Defendant

GARCIA

to

There was no need for

"object"

to

the

truthful

statement; his "failure to object" to an otherwise
truthful statement cannot be the basis for failing
to grant the statutorily-required "full hearing"
to which he was entitled.
5.

Defendant's

"failure

to

object"

to

the

otherwise-truthful statement that the CVR Office
"paid $7,000" in funeral expenses is not a waiver
of his "right to object" that "restitution" would
actually be sought and imposed ("ordered") against
him. The $7,000 amount did correspond to what the
CVR Office paid two years earlier, but the failure
to "object" thereto is not a "waiver" of his right
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to contest the IMPOSITION of restitution,

even

though the stated amount was
6.

GARCIA

did,

counsel- - -the

in

fact,

"restitution"

explain---through
that

issue:

the

"funeral expenses" were the subject of currentlyunderway "civil litigation". See TRANSCRIPT OF 2
JUNE 2008 SENTENCING, pages 9 {line 14-25) and 10
(lines 1-22). Judge Skanchy accepted that

"there

is a civil case pending" explanation {of Defense
Counsel Orifici) and ruled that the "restitution"
issue would be "left open" {Court's terminology} .
No legitimate "waiver" can come (or reasonably be
claimed to come} from Defendant's statements and
the acceptance by the Court---for whom the "presentence

report"

was

singularly

prepared---

thereof.
7.

The Board-claimed "waiver" {as to his right to

a "full hearing") allegedly arising from GARCIA'S
11

failure

statement

to
in

object"
the

to

the

otherwise-truthful

presentence

report

is

a

contortion and misreading and misapplication of
the two statutes [Sections 77-18-1 {6) {b} and 7738a-203 (2) {d)] describing the presentence report
and the effect of a failure to object.
The Board-identified excuses for its failure to hold
the

II

res ti tut ion hearing" - - -and more particularly, the "full

hearing" required by 77-27-5---are just that: excuses. Those
39
STEPHEN G HOMER
l..flORl'IIEV AT LAW

excuses do NOT justify the Board's failure to conduct the
statutorily-required "full hearing", as a pre-condition to
the imposition of "restitution"
Defendant

GARCIA

acknowledges

that

Page

5

of

the

"presentence report", under the general heading of "VICTIM
IMPACT STATEMENT AND RESTITUTION", contained the following
statement:
. . . She [Mrs Buckley] states that regarding
restitution she did file a civil suit in order for
Shane's automobile insurance to pay for the
accident. She states the matter is still pending
collection from the company and that they have
asked for an additional **** [Board-redacted
amount; probably circa $5,000+] which was over the
amount covered for the funeral expenses by Crime
Victim Reparations.
According to the Utah Office of Crime Victims
Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses
in this offense. Reference CVR # 151627 for
restitution payments.
Emphasis

added.

Bracketed

Presentence Report, p. 5.
this

BRIEF]

Presentence

The

AP&P

Report

material

added

for

clarity.

[RECORD at 176, ATTACHMENT 5 to
Investigator

(and/or

Mrs

who

Buckley

prepared

the

herself)

was

seemingly confused as to the precise nature of the civil
suit" she filed: her lawsuit was filed against GARCIA, whose
car was involved. His victim's (i.e.

"Shane's") liability

insurance would not have---and did not---defend GARCIA in
that "civil suit".
What

is

significant,

however,

about

statements (in the Presentence Report)

the

foregoing

is the simple fact

that IF the Board had truly read the Presentence Report
and/or

the

prepared

(for

GARCIA'S
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2008

"appeal")

and

presumptively-available TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING, the Board
would have been aware of the "civil suit" issue.
It is significant that this two-paragraph section of
pre-sentence

the

where

location

report---the

a

"recommendation" as to some kind of "restitution" might be
found---is itself facially devoid of any "recommendation"
(as to "restitution" or anything else).
The "RECOMMENDATION" portion of the Presentence Report
is located on Page 1 thereof and provides, in its entirety:
It is recommended by the staff of Adult Probation
and Parole that the defendant is sentenced to
serve the term at the Utah State Prison as
prescribed by law.
Emphasis added. Page 1, Presentence Report. RECORD at 172;
ATTACHMENT
single

5

to

this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

sentence

"recommendation"

"recommendation"

made

therein;

The
is

contrary

foregoing,
the

to

the

ONLY
Board's

patently false and misleading statements (that "restitution
was

recommended"

"Defendant's

[see,

failure

to

for

example,

challenge

the

RECORD

at

accuracy of

338:

this

recommended restitution amount at the time of sentencing

waived

any

future

challenge."

Emphasis

added.],

NO

restitution was ever recommended---not on page 1 within the
"RECOMMENDATION"

section

and

not

on

page

5

of

the

"RESTITUTION" section of the Presentence Report. There being
no

specific

"recommendation"

Defendant's claimed (by the Board)
illusory and misleading.

as

to

"restitution",

"failure to object" is

Defendant clearly did not thus
41

"waive" his right to the "full hearing" or his right to
"object" to Board-ordered

11

restitution 11

•

C

VIOLATION OF BOARD'S OWN
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS

In
(which

addition

to

the

arguably

ought

statutorily-imposed obligations
to

be

"enough 11

)

,

the

Board

has

violated its own publicly-promulgated (pursuant to the Utah
Administrative

Act)

Rule-Making

"administrative

regulations". Regulation R671-403 [entitled "Restitution"],
in effect in 2010 when the Board, in seeming "Star Chamber"
fashion

and

without

notice

to

GARCIA,

allegedly

(i.e.

claimed by the Board) "ordered" the restitution against him,
provides in relevant part:
. . . The offender and the victim(s) shall have
the right to be present at the hearing and present
evidence in their behalf.
Emphasis
added.
Procedure [2009].

Administrative

The Board appears to be

Regulation

R671-403.2

"violating its own rules",

which rules grant to the prisoner "the right to be present
at the hearing" and "[the right]
[his]

to present evidence in

behalf". That the Board itself characterizes these

conceptual principles as "rights" further undermines the
Board's claimed

11

waiver 11 excuse.
D

CONSTITUTIONAL "DUE PROCESS" VIOLATION
In addition to the statutory violations, the Board's
acknowledged failure to afford Defendant GARCIA the "full
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hearing"---or any hearing, in that regard---concerning the
"restitution" issue offends and violates his "due process of
law" rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, the latter of
which provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. Emphasis added. The
Board's action---first in considering and then in "ordering"
Defendant GARCIA to pay the $7,000 in "funeral expenses",
all without any "notice" to him and/or any "opportunity to
be heard"----clearly "deprives" GARCIA of his "property";
accordingly,

11

due

process

of

law"

is

constitutionally

required as a pre-condition to that governmental action.
There can be no "due process" in any situation undertaken in
violation

of

the

statutorily-prescribed conditions

and

prerequisites, legislatively-mandated to assure that very
"due process".
The minimum requirement for "due process of law" in
these situations are (1) adequate notice (that potentiallyadverse action against the person is contemplated by the
government agency) and (2) an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful manner (to challenge the intended agency action) .
Dairy Produce Services, Inc. vs City of Wellsville, 2000 UT

81, 13 P.3d 581; Miller vs USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, 44
P.3d 663 (Utah Supreme Court 2002); Wells vs Children's Aid
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Society of Utah,

681 P.2d 199

(Utah Supreme Court 1984);

Nelson vs Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah Supreme Court 1983);
Celebrity Club Inc. vs Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657

P.2d

1293

(Utah

administrative

Supreme

body

Court

issued

1982).

without

The

notice

order
to

of

an

affected

individuals violates due process. Morris vs Public Service
Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah Supreme Court

1958). Neither court nor other judicial tribunal may deny
constitutional right or deprive a person of vested property
interest

without

opportunity

to

Industrial Commission of Utah,

be

heard.

Hailing

vs

71 Utah 112,

263 Pac.

78

(Utah Supreme Court 1927).
E

THE "G.R.A.M.A. EVIDENCE" AND INFERENCES
The

District

Court's

"no

jurisdiction"

ruling

effectively precluded "pre-trial discovery" to ascertain the
operative
[Actual

II

11

facts 11 as to the Board-ordered "restitution".

discovery" in the

II

criminal" case

was arguably

minimal at best, given the already-completed status of the
underlying case.] Defendant GARCIA attempted to utilize the
G.R.A.M.A.

statute to force the Board to disclose these

relevant "records". GARCIA'S G.R.A.M.A. request (initially
in December 2013, and follow-up in June 2014) focused upon
the precise "restitution vote" issue, thus:
1.

Board

disclosure

recommendation"

of

the

operative

(or whatever existed)

specific "restitution" question,
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"staff

as to the

upon which the

five Boardmernbers were expected to individually
deliberate, decide and actually "vote".

"recommendation"

precise

the

seeing

actually

or

whatever)

[Without
(or

issue"

11

was

physically

presented to each voting Boardmember, it would be
impossible

to

ascertain

if

the

Boardmember

actually "voted" to "order restitution".]
2.

Board

document:
the

disclosure

of

the

the actual piece(s)

voting

"vote"

actual

of paper by which
it

Boardmembers---actually,

was

disclosed there were only three members voting--actually

"voted",

affirmative

that

is,

(to

"vote"

communicated

"order"

their

restitution),

without qualification or condition, to the other
Boardmembers
implementation
~

of

qualification
restitution]

to

and/or

or
by

the

that

condition
any

of

Boardmembers would violate

staff,

decision.
(as
the
the

to
three

for
[Any

"ordering"
"voting"

"majority vote"

requirement of Section 77-27-5(1) (c) .]
The Board actively and vigorously resisted disclosure of the
two categories of "restitution vote" records. This "stonewalling"

· approach

(undersigned's

terminology)

was

inexplicable: one would have thought the Board would want to
disclose the "hard evidence" of its statutory compliance.
But the opposite proved to be true: no disclosure, leading
to the conclusion that there was "something to hide".
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One

would

think

that

the

Board---then

presently

involved (as a claimed "real-party-in-interest") in active
litigation presumably headed "up on appeal" would want to
disclose its documents which (1) "restitution" was clearly
and actually "recommended" for the Board's "vote" and (2)
that the three Boardmembers---but only three---who actually
voted,

did

so

qualification.
G.R.A.M.A.
that

the

in
That

an

affirmative

manner

and

without

the Board continuously resisted the

disclosure leads to the unavoidable inference
undisclosed documents

are antagonistic

to the

Board's orally-claimed position.
The
before

Board's
actually

failure

to

conduct

"ordering"

the

"restitution" invalidates the Board's

the

"full

Defendant
11

order 11

•

hearing"
to

make

The "civil

judgment" resulting from the "filing" of that statutorilydefective, constitutionally-defective and administrativelydefective "order of restitution" must be set aside.
III

THE BOARD-ORDERED "RESTITUTION" FOR "FUNERAL EXPENSES"
IS STATUTORILY DEFECTIVE AND INVALID DUE TO THE BOARD'S
FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADHERE TO THE STATUTORY DEFINITION
OF "PECUNIARY DAMAGES", WHICH IN THIS CASE FOR TIME-BARRED
PURSUANT TO APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR
"WRONGFUL DEATH" CLAIMS

The single-vehicle accident which resulted in the death
of Defendant's passenger occurred in March 2006. Defendant
was convicted of the felony offense in April 2008, but was
not sentenced until June 2008.
statute

of

limitation---under

[By that time the applicable
78-12-28
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(repealed

2008)

and/or 78B-2-304 (2)

(adopted 2008) ---had already "run", to

bar any "wrongful death" claim. Because ·the State "Crime
Victims Reparation"
filed

office had not then

"wrongful death"

(by March 2008)

litigation against GARCIA on its

"subrogation" claim, any corresponding "restitution" ordered
by the Board would have been technically impossible. Even if
the

Board

"ordered"

the

restitution

in October 2010---

disputed by Defendant- - -the claim would still have been
barred.]
The Board's "authority" to order a prisoner within its
custody to pay "restitution" is entirely statutory.
The statute [77-27-6 (2) (b)] provides, in relevant part:
(2) (b)
In accordance with Section 77-38a302(5) (d) (ii),
the board may order that
a
defendant make restitution for pecuniary damages
that were not determined by the court, unless the
board applying the criteria as set forth in
Section 77-38a-302 determines that restitution is
inappropriate.
Emphasis added.
Subsection

77-38a-102 (6),

within

the

"definitions"

section of the Crime Victims Restitution Act,

"defines"

"pecuniary damages" thus:
( 6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable
economic injury, whether or not incurred, which a
person could recover in a civil action arising out
of
the
facts
or
events
constituting
the
defendant's criminal activities . . .
Emphasis added.
The statutory "definition" of "pecuniary damages"--that

"definition"

provisions

not

being further

restricted by statutory

applicable here- - -seemingly expansive
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in

scope ( 11 all demonstrable economic injury 11

but nevertheless

)

includes the restrictive phrase
11

which a person could recover in a civil action 11

Emphasis

added.

legally---as the

In
11

the

GARCIA

•

setting- - - factually

and

restitution 11 issue was before---as claimed

by the Board, but disputed by GARCIA---the Board of Pardons
in October 2010, the following facts are

11

operative 11

(and

even admitted by GARCIA):
1.

Defendant's

2.

The

Utah

11

victim 11 died in March 2006.

Crime Victims

Reparation

[ 11 CVR"]

payment of $7,000 to Mrs Gail Buckley, mother and
court-designated "personal representative" of the
deceased' s "probate estate", occurred in September
2006.
Defendant was "sentenced" to prison in June

3.

2008.
At

4.

the

earliest,

the

restitution in October 2010.
the

Board's

assertion

Board

"ordered"

[Defendant DISPUTES

that

"restitution"

was

actually "ordered" at that time.]
Under

"subrogation

Reparations

office

Representative

for

law"

principles,

payment

of

$7,000

"funeral

the
to

expenses 11

Crime

Victims

the

Personal

effectively

"substituted" the state agency "to stand in the shoes of"
(undersigned's terminology) that Personal Representative.
With that September 2006 payment, the State agency acquired--at least to the limit of its $7,000 payment---the "right"
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to bring its own litigation against Defendant GARCIA for the
"funeral

Representative

reimbursed

thus

expenses"
Gail

Buckley.

However,

Personal

to

those

same

legal

restrictions (for example lack of negligence on Defendant's
part, comparative negligence by deceased passenger, timebarred defense under applicable statute of limitation, and
so

forth)

which

could

have

been

asserted

against

the

Personal Representative would nevertheless be available (for
assertion by Defendant GARCIA) against the State CVR claim.
Former Section 78-12-28(2)---repealed, renumbered [to
Section

78B-2-304(2),

and

reenacted

pursuant

to

the

Legislature 1 s 2008 recodification of the "Title 78--Judicial
Code II of the Utah Code, effective 7 February 2 008- - -provided
in relevant part:
An action may be brought within two years:
(2) for recovery of damages for a death
caused by the wrong act or neglect of
another;
Emphasis added.
These foregoing
is

perhaps

a

more

11

overlapping 11 ---actually "bookending"

accurate

terminology- - - "statutes

of

limitation" combine to require that the State Office for
Crime Victim Reparations

[CVR]

litigation, under its own

name and pursuant to its "subrogation" entitlement to do so,
had to be filed BEFORE the March 2008 2-year deadline; the
State s
1

litigation simply wasn't filed then,

time.
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nor at any

r

\'i;i)I

Had
GARCIA

the

(1)

Board given---the

Board didn't---Defendant

"notice" of its intention to

and/or (2) the statutorily-required
5 (1)

11

11

order restitution 11

full hearing 11 [77-27-

(c)] on the "restitution" issue, the Board would have

learned from GARCIA of this "defense" thereto. Having failed
to give GARCIA the

11

full hearing 11 [see Point II, above], the

Board cannot complain or object to what might have been told
to it.
In

any

event,

the

fact

that

the

minimum, at least four years (or more)
the

"restitution",

prohibits,

as

a

11

Board was,

as

a

late 11 in "ordering"

matter

of

law,

the

underlying validity of its "restitution order": the Board's
"order"

of

"restitution",

exceeding and outside

statutory "definition" of the

11

pecuniary damages",

of

the

is an

ultra vires act.
The resultant "civil judgment" flowing from the filing
of the thus-defective "order of restitution" must be set
aside.
IV
THE BOARD-CREATED AND BOARD-FILED "ORDER OF RESTITUTION"
IS DEFECTIVE AND INVALID, DUE TO ITS UNTIMELY "MAKING"
WHICH DID NOT OCCUR WITHIN THE STATUTORILY-PRESCRIBED
PERIOD OF TIME (77-27-6(4): "WITHIN 60 DAYS")
OF THE PRISONER'S RELEASE FROM CUSTODY;
THE RESULTANT "CIVIL JUDGMENT" MUST BE SET ASIDE

The Board-prepared "order of restitution", ostensibly
"made" as of 24 September 2013 as of its thus stated "date",
was "forwarded" [statutory term] to the Third District Court
(as "the sentencing court") on or about 10 October 2013 and

so
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thereafter "entered on the judgment docket". The "making" of
that "restitution order" runs afoul of the "within 60 days"
(of the prisoner's release) requirement of Section 77-276 ( 4)

;

the

resultant

"civil

judgment"

arising

f ram

the

subsequent "forwarding", "referring" and/or "entry" of the
facially-defective "order" is defective, improper and must
be set aside.
Section 77-27-6(4), Utah Code, applicable to the Board
and

expressly

in

the

context

of

"restitution"

ordered

against prisoners, provides in relevant part:
(4)
If
the
defendant,
upon
termination or
expiration of the sentence owes outstanding fines,
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days
after the termination or expiration of the
defendant's sentence, the matter shall be referred
to the district court for civil collection
remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall
forward a restitution order to be entered on the
judgment docket. The entry shall constitute a lien
and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for
money in a civil judgment.

Emphasis added.
Section

77-27-6 (2) (c),

Utah

Code,

reaffirms

the

legislative intent by providing:
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (d), the
board shall make all orders of restitution within
60 days after the termination or expiration of the
defendant's sentence.
Emphasis

added.

The

introductory

provided by Subsection

(2) (d) ":

phrasing

("except

as

pertaining to prisoners

incarcerated for other charges and sentences extending past
the

current

situation.

sentence)
The

is

inapplicable

Subsection

(c)
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says

to

"all

the

GARCIA

orders":

no

exceptions and no excuses.
Defendant GARCIA was released from prison on 15 April
2013. The "within 60 days" time-period expired on or about
14 June 2013; the Board's "order", "made" as of 24 September
2013

is months and months

"late".

The BOARD offered no

rebuttal "evidence" to show the 24 September 2013 document
was not created ("made") on that date.
The

statutory

ambiguous;
means

to

word

the word,
create

"made"

in "plain,

or

to

is

not

confusing

or

common everyday English"

bring

into

existence,

perhaps

composing from pre-existing materials into a composite item.
In this sense, the word

11

made 11 ---although not frequently the

subject of "legal" or legislative usage as to describe the
process

(or product)

of governmental agency action---is

straight-forward and precise.
(and/or its Chairperson)

In this context,

"made"

the

the Board

"restitution order"

ostensibly by combining an otherwise blank sheet of paper
and

affixing,

in

a

computer printer,

cartridge toner" thereto. Thereafter, an

the black
II

"toner

ink" signature was

affixed. The "order" was thus "made" or created or brought
into existence, as such.
In the

trial

court

the Board's

counsel

(Ms

Reber)

attempted to excuse the facially-obvious violation of the
"within 60 days"

(of release)

rule by arguing that the

Board---in October 2010---had "ordered" the restitution and
thus

the

situation

fell

within

the

first

introductory

phrasing of the first sentence of Subsection 77-27-6(4),
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pertaining to "If the defendant owes restitution
as

to avoid the

"within 60

days"

requirement

• II 1

SO

occurring

within the second dependent phrase. The Board's argument was
flawed,
1.

for numerous reasons:
The Defendant GARCIA did not "owe 11

- - -

then, in

2010---any "restitution"; none had been "ordered"
by the District Court.
2.

The Board-ordered "restitution",

arising

from

its

action

in

ostensibly

October

2010,

was

without the statutorily-required "full hearing" as
well being also in violation of constitutional
"due process II

standards.

See

Point

II

of

this

$7,000,

for

APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
3.

The

"funeral

subrogation
expenses"

claim

reimbursed

(for
to

the

victim's

mother and Personal Representative) was obviously
time-barred

by

the

applicable

statute

of

limitation; the Board's "order" was and/or would
be ultra vires. See Point III of this APPELLANT'S
BRIEF.
The "second" phrase is applicable and controlling for the
following reasons:
1.

First, the statutory requirement is clear; the

requirement speaks in terms of "making" an order,
which will be thereafter "forwarded" and "entered"
and so forth, to achieve the statutorily-described
result: the so-called "civil judgment" so entered
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against Defendant GARCIA.
talk about
Thus,

11

the

critical

deciding 11 to
11

date 11

and

of

11

The statute does NOT
order 11 the restitution.

the

actual

dispositive;

decision-making process

the

"making"
date

(or even the

of

is
any

resultant

decision), even from years earlier, is irrelevant.
2.

Secondly, the Board-created 2010 documents---

the

October

"correcting"

7th

"INITIAL

October

13th

HEARING"

and

"HEARING

the

OFFICER

RESULTS" documents- - -do not themselves claim to be
an

11

order

language

of

restitution".

contained

arguably confusing:

therein

[The
is

"restitution"
ambiguous

and

it is arguable whether the

Board actually decided anything specific as to
"ordered" restitution, or was merely leaving it up
to a later "referral" to the District Court. For
example

I

the ORIGINAL HEARING document

states,

albeit under the "Hearing Notes" section of the
document:
1.
Other: The restitution owed of
$7000.00 on Case # 06-1607 will be
forwarded to the sentencing Court for a
Civil Judgement(sic).
Emphasis added.
this

RECORD at 188; ATTACHMENT 8 to

APPELLANT'S

BRIEF.

indicate---particularly

There
to

is

nothing

Defendant

to

GARCIA,

incarcerated and without ready access to legal
counsel---the

Board

had
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thus

"ordered"

restitution. The phrase

II

shall be forwarded to the

sentencing Court for a Civil Judgement (sic)" could
be readily understood (by GARCIA) that there was
going to be a new civil case filed against him.
[See also his bi-weekly "NORMS Statements", which
continuously and affirmatively indicated, for the
entirety of his 5-year incarceration, that "zero"
restitution

was

owing.

RECORD

at

383-384;

ATTACHMENT 11 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.]
The HEARING OFFICER RESULTS document [RECORD
at 190, ATTACHMENT 9 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF],
dated six days later, facially purporting to be a
"correcting"

document

for

"clerical error",

even more vague and ambiguous,

is

by providing in

relevant part:
Hearing notes:
2.
Other. The restitution owed will be
forwarded to the sentencing Court for a
Civil Judgement(sic).
Emphasis added.

RECORD at 190; ATTACHMENT 9 to

this APPELLANT'S BRIEF. Again, the written text is
devoid of any affirmative "indication" that the
Board

has

actually

"restitution",

"ordered"

GARCIA

for which---in this

to

pay

"correcting"

document---NO "amount" is stated, thus leading to
additional confusion on GARCIA' s

part.

The TWO

October 2010 documents must be compared to and
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contrasted

with

RESTITUTION"

the

which

September ·2013
"looks"

like

"ORDER

an

OF

operative

"ORDER OF RESTITUTION", "forwarded" and so forth.
3.

Similarly, those October 2010 documents were

NOT

"filed"

September

with

2013

the

District

"order

WAS

so

Court;

the

"forwarded"

24
and

"entered". IF the 2010 documents were intended and
then (by the Board) considered to be "restitution
orders",
such?

why were they not actually "filed" as

[Rhetorical question.] As the October 2013

was so "made" and thereafter "filed" ("forwarded")
and entered?
4.

That

the

Board

actually

"filed"

its

24

September 2013 "restitution order" establishes its
intentions,

then (in 2010)

and now:

the October

2010 documents are not "restitution orders" and
were never intended to be such.
5.

Lastly,

September

and most importantly,

2013

"order"

it is THE 24

which brings

about

the

result complained of in this proceeding.
Due to the untimely "making" of the Board-filed "order
of restitution", the resultant "civil judgment" must be set
aside.

56
STEPHEN G HOMER
ATTORNEY Al \AW

V

•

,-.,'.\

THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-27-5(3)
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE
"OPEN COURTS" PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
[ARTICLE I, SECTION 11]

The State has argued that the provisions of Section 7727- 5 ( 3), Utah Code, preclude the Court from reviewing the
decision of the Board of Pardons in this case. Indeed, the
provisions

of

Section

77-27-5(3)

are

quite

clear

and

unambiguous and state in relevant part:
( 3)
Decisions of the board in cases involving
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines and
forfeitures are final and are not subject to
judicial review.

Emphasis added.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial
and unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in the State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.

Emphasis added.
The "open courts" violation is as obvious as the nose
on one's face:

a Board decision

(specifically,

involving

"restitution" as in the GARCIA situation) is insulated from
any and all "judicial review". No if's, and's or but's. The
"restitution order" wrongfully issued [see Points II, III
and IV, herein] against GARCIA is certainly an "injury done
to him in his

.

immunizes the Board

.

property",

but

(and it's "order")
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Section 77-27-5(3)
from any and all

"judicial review". FOOTNOTE 6
A

preservation of issue and standard of review

The

District

Court

"unconstitutionality
"DEFENDANT'S

of

MOTION

FOR

was

presented

statute"

issue

JUDICIAL

with

the

pursuant

to

DETERMINATION

OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE [77-27-5 (3)]

11 ,

dated/filed 24

April 2014. RECORD at 288-289. The Utah Attorney General was
notified of this "unconstitutionality" challenge to a Utah
statute pursuant to mailed "Defendant's Notification", dated
24 April 2014, RECORD at 290-291.
Notwithstanding

the

"strong

presumption

of

constitutionality" afforded a validly-adopted statute [see
Maxfield vs Herbert, 2012 UT 44, 115, 284 P.3d 647 (Utah

Supreme Court 2012) and Peterson vs Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT
42,

1

23,

48 P.3d 941

(Utah Supreme Court 2002), and the

challenging party's "heavy burden" [Jones vs Utah Board of
Pardons

Supreme

&

Parole,

Court

2004 UT 53,

2004)],

1

Defendant

10,

94

GARCIA

P. 3d 283

(Utah

accepts

that

challenge.

Although not involving the "unconstitutionality" of
Section 77-27-5(3) per se, the Board 1 s action in imposing
"restitution"---ostensibly following the 5 October 2010
11 initial hearing", but without notice to or participation by
GARCIA, for a civil claim ("pecuniary damages") which were
clearly time-barred and for which the Board was "late" in
"making" (statutory term) its "order of restitution" - - violates the "no person shall be barred from . . . defending
before any tribunal" requirement contained in the latter
half of Article I, Section 11.
6
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B

Defendant's "standing" and parties

Defendant-Appellant GARCIA is the subject of a "civil
judgment" (for $7,000) for "restitution", arising from the
administrative decision of the Utah Board of Pardons and
Parole.

In that capacity, he certainly has "standing" to

raise the "unconstitutionality" challenge to the statute
relied upon by the Board is "defending" its decision and/or
seeking

to

deny

GARCIA' s

certainly

claims,

in

the

"restitution" context in which he is involved.
The UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE,

a Utah state

government agency, in January 2014 petitioned the District
Court for "voluntary intervention" in this case: to "defend"
the "restitution order"

the Board made and caused to be

"entered" against GARCIA. The Board---represented by legal
counsel from the Office of Utah Attorney General---is a
proper party to "defend" the statute.

[Although "notified"

of Defendant's "unconstitutionality motion" in the District
Court, the Utah Attorney General did not personally appear
in the case, but rather allowed the staff attorneys (ala Ms
Reber) assigned to the Board to defend.
C

unconstitutionality under Foote (1991)

The facial "unconstitutionality" of Section 77-27-5 (3) --which, without exception or limitation, effectively denies
and prohibits

all

"judicial

review"

of

Board decisions

across the whole "range" ( of Board decisions) - - - is obvious:
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the statute clearly violates the "open courts" provisions of
the Utah Constitution, as contained in Article I, Section 11
thereof.
In Foote vs Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
Supreme

Court

1991),

an

"habeas

corpus"

case

filed

to

challenge Parole Board decisions (for parole, not granted)
after an unsuccessful "Anders brief appeal" the defendant's
original criminal conviction,
called

upon

to

the Utah Supreme Court was

discuss---and

did

so---the

so-called

"collateral attack". Concerning the petitioner's claims (for
habeas corpus relief) and the provisions of Section 77-275(3), the Utah Supreme Court wrote:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (3) provides that
determinations and decisions of the board of
pardons in cases involving the approval or denial
of paroles are final and not subject to judicial
review. Thus there is no right of appeal from a
decision of the board of pardons. Since an appeal
is barred by this provision, and since an appeal
is the only legal remedy that could exist in this
case, it follows that no remedy at law exists.
However, if section 77-27-5(3) was intended to
preclude all judicial review, both by way of law
and by way of extraordinary writs, then that
section runs afoul of article I, section 11 of the
Utah Constitution. [Footnote to Dunn v. Cook, 791

P.2d 873

(Utah 1990)]

808 P.2d at 735.
Al though
invalidate

in

(as

Foote

Utah

unconstitutional)

probably because the
expressly

the

sought

Supreme
Section

"habeas corpus"
such

Court

did

not

77-27-5(3)---

proceeding had not

relief---the

Supreme

Court

nevertheless could not have been more clear in its opinion.
Indeed, it would seem obvious to all that any statute which
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precluded "judicial review" of the administrative agency
would "run afoul" of the "open courts" provisions of the
Utah Constitution [Article I, Section 11] . In any event, the
Utah Supreme Court ignored the obviously-unconstitutional
statutory

provision

implicitly grant)

and

proceeded

to

consider

(and

the sought-for habeas corpus relief, at

least to remand to a district court for evidentiary hearing
on the petitioner's claims.
The provisions of Section 77-27-5 (3)

are clear and

unambiguous: no alternative interpretation can be adopted or
developed, to avoid the "unconstitutional" result that the
Legislature

has

intended.

Legislature

may

be

[While

understandable,

the

"intent"

even

of

the

laudable,

the

blanket prohibition against any and all "judicial review" is
the statute's fatal "Achilles' heel 11 from which there is no
survival. J The statute clearly offends the "open courts"
provisions of the Utah Constitution, contained in Article I,
Section 11. Clearly, the Defendant's "constitutional right"
to keep and maintain "property" and/or to not be deprived
thereof "without due process of law" [Article I, Section 7]
are valuable rights; violations- - -or alleged violations- - -of
such rights must be subject to judicial review.

On this

point, the Foote opinion noted:
In addition, the mandate of the due process
clause of article I, section 7 of the Declaration
of
Rights
in
the
Utah
Constitution
is
comprehensive in its application to all activities
of state government. It is the province of the
judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of
due process by an arm of government be heard and,
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justified, that it be vindicated. What may
constitute due process in any given circumstance
may vary, but assuredly, the parole board is not
outside the constitutional mandate that the
actions of government must afford due process of
law.
if

808 P.2d at 735. Emphasis added.
Indeed,
preclude,

the

without

obvious

thrust

exception,

of

any

the

and

Statute

all

is

to

recourse

to

"judicial review" of Board actions and decisions.
In the instant setting,

the Court has no convenient

alternative by which to side-step this important issue: the
Defendant---clearly having

11

standing 11 to make the claim---

has asserted the "unconstitutionality" of the Statute.
Indeed, given the "habeas corpus relief is allowed" (in
spite of the Statute's provisions to the contrary) result in
Foote,

the Utah Supreme Court might

be

deemed to

have

implicitly determined the Statute to be unconstitutional,
without explicitly saying so. In the instant situation, the
Court of Appeals would be following the implicit "precedent"
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Foote.
D

Unconstitutionality of Section 77-27-5(3)
under Berry vs Beech Aircraft analysis

In Berry vs Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717 P.2d 670
(Utah Supreme Court 1985), the Utah Supreme Court determined
that

the

Utah

Products

Liability

statute

of

repose---

requiring tort litigation to be brought six years after the
product's first use or ten years after manufacture---to be
unconstitutional, as violative of "open courts" provision.
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In Horton vs Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah
Supreme Court 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held the Utah
"architects and builders statute of repose" violated the
"open courts" provision of Utah Constitution in that it does
not provide injured persons with effective and reasonable
alternative

remedy

for

vindication

of

his

or

her

constitutional interest. The Court found the elimination of
cause of action was an

arbitrary and unreasonable means of

achieving statutory objective of limiting stale claims and
protecting construction industry. The Goldminer's Daughter
majority, described the two-part test adopted in Berry vs
Beech Aircraft and wrote:
Berry established the following two-part test
to determine whether a statute that limits one's
right to remedy by due course of law for injury to
one's "person, property, or reputation" violates
Article I, section 11:

First, section 11 is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective
and reasonable alternative remedy "by due
course of law" for vindication of his
constitutional interest.
Second, if there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation
of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy
is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means
for achieving the objective.
717 P.2d at 680.
In the instant situation,
Board-ordered

to

pay

$7,000

Defendant GARCIA has been
in

restitution

which---as

described in Points II, III, IV and V, above---he should not
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have been so ordered.

Section 77-27-5 (3)

clearly is

"a

statute that limits one's right to remedy by due course of
law

for

injury

to

supra):

Daughter,

.

one's
the

property"

Statute

(Gold.miner's

(77-27-5(3)]

bars

ALL

"judicial review" of a Board "decision" for "restitution"
(in GARCIA' s

case)

and a

lot of other cases

(for other

similarly-situated persons). Applying the Berry vs Beech
Aircraft standards to Section 77-27-5(3):

The

II

first II

standard- - -does

the

statute

provide an "effective and reasonable alternative
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of
his

constitutional

interest?---cannot

be

satisfied. Section 77-27-5(3) is absolute in its
terms:

judicial

review

of

Board

decisions

is

prohibited in all cases. No alternative remedy is
allowed.
The statute's failure under the first standard
invokes the "second" standard: namely, "abrogation
of

the

remedy

decisions)

(i.e.

judicial

review

of

Board

may be justified only if there is a

clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and
the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
that objective." The Legislature, in enacting 7727-5(3),

has

identified

no

"clear

social

or

economic evil to be eliminated" if there were to
be

the

proscribed

II

judicial
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review"

of

Board

decisions.

Nor has the Legislature attempted to

"narrow" the scope of the prohibition .

•.:.:1

1alY

Having "judicial review" of Board decisions is not "a
clear social or economic evil"; the Board is subject to the
law just like every other agency of State government. See
quotation from Foote, in Point v-c, above [page 55].
In Goldminer's Daughter the Supreme Court noted that
the

Legislature

limitation

in

enacting

the

(barring the claim)

applicable

statute

of

had identified no "clear

social or economic evil".
The following decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and
the principles of law contained therein describing the

II

open

courts" provisions are applicable to the situation-at-hand.
Day vs State ex rel Utah Department of Public Safety, 1999

UT 46, 980 P. 2d 1171 (Utah Supreme Court 1999) [governmental
immunity statute barring claim for injuries arising from
police

vehicle

chases

Julian vs State,

violates

966 P.2d 249

[attempted

application

limitation

to

habeas

of

open

provision] ;

(Utah Supreme Court 1998)

catch-all

corpus

courts

4-year

proceedings

statute

violates

of

"open

courts II provisions of constitution] ; Currier vs Holden, 862
P.2d 1357 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993), certiorari denied
870 P.2d 957 [three-month statute of limitation for habeas
corpus
courts"

relief

was

unconstitutional

provisions];

Sun

Incorporated vs Herm Hughes

(Utah Supreme Court 1989)

&

Valley

as
Water

violating
Beds

of

"open
Utah,

Son, Incorporated, 782 P. d 188

[architects and builders statute
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of repose violates "open courts" provisions]; Lee vs Gaufin,
867

P.2d

572

(Utah

[holding

19 93)

unconstitutional

legislative abrogation of remedies based on economic and
social problems that had occurred in other states but not in
Utah].
The above-referenced

11

statute of

limitation"

cases

(e.g. Berry, Goldminer's Daughter, Sun Valley Water Beds,
Julian, Day and others) are, in principle, applicable to the

"no judicial review" (of Board decisions) statutes: if the
"statute of limitations" statutes, restricting the impacted
person by limiting that person's access to judicial remedy,
are violative of the "open courts" guarantee, then Section
77-27-5(3)---which in all cases and for all time, prohibits
any and all "judicial review"---must certainly violate the
"open courts" provision. The Utah Supreme Court in Foote
readily observed as much, but had not been asked for the
"unconstitutionality" determination. GARCIA is asking for it
now.
That there are other cases---numerous cases, even (e.g
Julian, Currier and others)---which have ignored the clear

prohibitions (i.e. "no judicial review") of 77-27-5(3) is
not an indication of an alternative interpretation of the
statutory text; there can be no other meaning than that so
clearly

stated.

That

other

cases

may

have

avoided

confronting the "unconstitutionality" issue---because those
appellate courts were not expressly requested to do so---is
not evidence of the statutes validity. On the contrary, that
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the appellate courts have "skirted the issue" is an implicit
recognition of the statute's invalidity.
CONCLUSION

The

District

Court

does

have

"jurisdiction" - - -even

"civil" jurisdiction---over the Board-ordered
as

such

"jurisdiction"

reason of

the

Board's

arises,

pursuant

"forwarding"

and

11

to

restitution 11
statute,

"referring"

,

by
its

"restitution order" to the District Court, which "order" was
thereafter "entered on the judgment docket". The District
Court's "jurisdiction" includes Rule 60 (b) remedies to "set
aside"

the

resultant

"civil

judgment"

entered

against

Defendant GARCIA.
The Board admits that it failed---prior to "ordering"
the Defendant's "restitution"---to conduct any "restitution
hearing". This failure falls far short of the statutory [7727-5 (3)]

requirement

and

limitation:

namely,

that

"no

restitution may be ordered . . . except after a full hearing
. . . ". No hearing---let alone the "full hearing"---having
been

first

conducted,

the

"order

of

restitution"

was

improperly "made" and the "civil judgment" resulting from
the filing of that "order" must be set aside.
The
didn't

Board's
"request"

claimed
a

justifications- - -the

hearing

and/or

the

Defendant

Defendant

thus

"waived" his hearing by failing to object to the truthful
statement of fact
$7000 11

[namely, that "CVR claimed to have paid

(paraphrased)] within the presentence report---are

inadequate reasons for the Board's failure to follow the
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statutory requirements directly applicable hereto.
The Board's decision to
made

as

early

as

11

order 11 restitution---even if

October

statutorily-required

"full

invalid and ultra vires.

(albeit

2010

without

hearing" - - -is

the

nevertheless

The Board is allowed to "order

restitution" only for "pecuniary damages", which are further
defined as what a person "might recover in a civil action" .
The $7,000 "funeral expenses"---ostensibly incurred and/or
paid in March 2006 (at time of death)---were time-barred by
the two-year statute of limitation (for "wrongful death") of
Section 7 8 B - 2 - 3 0 4 ( 2 ) ,

Utah Code .

Thus ,

no

" restitution"

could have been ordered therefor. The "civil judgment" must
be set aside.
The Board-filed "order of restitution" was untimely
"made", as not occurring "within 60 days" of the expiration
of GARCIA' s sentence of incarceration. The resulting "civil
judgment" arising from the "entry" of that "order" must be
set aside.
The Statute (Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code)
and unequivocal in its direction,

is clear

intent and scope:

ALL

"judicial review" of Board decisions is prohibited. There
are

NO

exceptions.

That

some

case

law

decisions

have

overlooked the otherwise all-encompassing provisions of the
statute does not validate the statute; those cases did not
involve

a

direct

"unconstitutionality",

attack

upon

the

statute's

upon which the decisions made no

direct ruling. In fact, that the former courts ignored the
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that

of

evidence

is

prohibitions

statutory

same

unconstitutionality, even if the courts didn't say so. But
Foote did expressly say so, even if in a

all-encompassing

prohibition

embodied with 77-27-5 (3)
courts"

provisions

against

II

dicta II manner. The
"judicial

review"

flies in the face of the "open

of Article

I,

Section 11.

should make that judicial determination, as so

The Court
11

moved 11 by

Defendant GARCIA.
The Court of Appeals must decide the

II

jurisdiction"

issue: if only to advise District Courts and the Board of
'~

the requirements of the law on that narrow question.
The Court of Appeals should decide the "on-the-merits"
substantive issues raised---lack of "full hearing", timebarred "funeral expenses", and untimely "made" restitution
order---to avoid GARCIA from the continuing and lingering
effects of the undeserved "civil judgment" entered against

'~

him: future execution and/or garnishment, as well as adverse
"credit report" which seriously affects job potential and
housing

opportunities.

The

identified

issues

decided to authoritatively avoid future

should be

situations

(and

appeals) which may result from similar actions by the Board,
taken against similarly-undeserving persons (e.g. on parole
or

awaiting

parole)

who

may

not

be

in

a

position

to

meaningfully challenge such illegal actions. The Court of
Appeals should remand the case back to the District Court
for entry of judgment in accordance with its decision.
The

Court

of

Appeals
69
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must

decide

the

"unconstitutionality''

question:

Defendant

GARCIA

has

"standing", is economically threatened by invocation of the
statute, and has made a more-than-adequate demonstration of
the

statute's

"unconstitutionality",

which

has

already

(Foote) been already been judicially recognized.
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
["BAD FAITH" LITIGATION: Section 78B-5-825, Utah Code]

The Board's admitted failure to hold the statutorilyrequired

II

full

contradiction

hearing"
to

as

a

prerequisite

own

its

and

in

publicly-promulgated

"administrative regulations" and notions of constitutional
"procedural due process" standards, its "restitution order"
for pecuniary damages which were facially time-barred and
thus

ultra

statutorily

vires,
11

late 11

and

its

11

filing 11

of

an

"order"

in its making but nevertheless

was
thus

creating an immediately-enforceable "civil judgment" upon an
undeserving person,

have each worked to cause Defendant

GARCIA

attorney's

significant

"restitution

order".

jurisdiction"

assertions

fees

Coupled
to

with

to
the

the District

set

aside

the

Board's

"no

Court

and the

resulting necessary appeal thereof, those actions constitute
"bad faith litigation" for which Defendant seeks and should
be awarded reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section
78B-5-825, Utah Code.

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Defendant-Appellant GARCIA requests that the Utah Court
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of Appeals grant "oral argument" prior to considering and
adjudging this appeal.

COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION ["WORD COUNT" AND TYPE SIZE]

The undersigned counsel certifies that the text and
footnotes

within

the

foregoing

APPELLANT'S

BRIEF

were

printed in 13-point Courier type (font) and that the "word
count" for the BRIEF- - -exclusive of Table of Contents, Table
of

Authorities

"Constitutional

and
and

Rule-required
Statutory

quotations

Provisions"---was

within
13,483

words, as indicated by the "word count" subroutine of the
WordPerfect 5 .1 word-processing system upon which the typed
material was created.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 2015.
/s/ Stephen G Homer
STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
DENNIS J GARCIA
CERTIFICATE

I certify that I caused a two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, with attachments (addenda), to be handdelivered to the office of Mr Sean Reyes, Utah Attorney
General, Ms Nancy Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, Utah
Attorney General's Office, Heber Wells Building, Fifth
Floor, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th
day of March, 2015.
ls/Stephen G Homer
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UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
ORDER OF RESTITUTION

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
Third District-Salt Lake

Salt Lake County

vs

Dennis Garcia (OFF# 184816)
Defendant

Case Number: 061901607 -

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-6(4), the Board of Pardons and Parole
has determined that the above-entitled Defendant owes restitution. The Defendant should
make payments as follows:
Pay restitution in the amount of $7,000.00 to UOVC

When entered on the Courts Docket, this Order shall constitute a lien against the
Defendant and is subject to the Rules that apply in any Civil Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24 th day of September 2013

BY THE BOARD:

~-Chairman

ATTACHMENT 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON
MOTION TO SET ASIDE RESTITUTION
ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

yj)

vs.

CASE NO.

061901607

DENNIS GARCIA,
Defendant.

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

On March 24, 2014, the Court had before it defendant Dennis Garcia's
("Mr. Garcia") Motion to Set Aside the Restitution Order from the Utah
Board of Pardons and Parole

("Board").

Mr. Garcia was represented by

Stephen Homer, and the Board was represented by Sharel Reber and Amanda
Jex.

The matter was fully briefed by the parties, argument was made, and

the matter is now ready for decision.
Factual Background

Mr.

Garcia was convicted of Automobile Homicide,

a third degree

felony, by a jury on April 17, 2008, and was sentenced on June 2, 2008
to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years at the Utah State
Prison.

On the date of Mr. Garcia's sentence the issue of restitution

was left open.
restitution

owed

Ultimately,
by

Mr.

the Court never determined the amount of

Garcia,

within

one

year

of

Mr.

Garcia's

sentencing date.

ATTACHMENT 2
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STATE V. GARCIA

Mr. Garcia's Presentence Report, dated May 28, 2008, under section
"Victim Impact Statement and iestitution,, reads "(a]ccording· to the Utah
Office of Crime Victim Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses
in this offense," whi~h information was available to Mr. Garcia and his
counsel at the time of sentencing.

(Presentence Report, p. 5.)

Garcia's original Board hearing, on October 5,

2010,

At Mr.

a Board hearing

officer informed Mr. Garcia as to restitution " ... I know there's seven
thousand dollars was paid by a state agency for
(Hearing Transcript,

p.

funeral

The Board's "Original

6. )

costs .... "

Hearing," dated

October 7, 2010 thereby ordered "[t]he restitution owed of $7,000.00 on
Case # 06-107 will be forwarded to the sentencing Court for a Civil
Judgment." (Original Hearing.)
13, 2013.
27-6(4),

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-

(Hearing Officer Results.)
on

September

24,

Restitution" indicating Mr.
payable to

Mr. Garcia's sentence expired on April

the

2013

Board

entered

Garcia still owed $7,000

an

"Order

of

in restitution

uovc.
Discussion

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

77-38a-302 (5) (d) (i),

"[e] xcept as

provided in Subsection (5) (d) (ii) ... the Court shall make all restitution
orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year
after sentencing." At the time Mr. Garcia was sentenced on June 2, 2008
this Court left the issue of restitution open.

Ultimately, the Court
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never determined the amount of restitution and Mr. Garcia entered the
Utah Prison under the direction of the Board.
Utah

Code

Ann.,

Subsection

(5) (d) (ii),

provides

that

"[a]ny

pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons· and·
Parole." Utah courts have long recognized that ''Once a court imposes a
'vi)

valid sentence,

it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."

State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vaughn,
201i UT App 411,

~

11, 266 P.3d 202.

This Court entered a valid sentence

in this case, and thereby lost subject matter jurisdiction.

Furthermore,

once the one-year period after sentencing expired, this Court also lost
jurisdiction over Mr.

Garcia's restitution obligation.

Jurisdiction

moved to the Board to determine restitution owed.
The Court hereby concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to set aside
the Board's claim for restitution against Mr. Garcia.

The Board's claim

for restitution is not subject to judicial review by this Court.

The

Court imposed a prison sentence on June 2, 2008, thereby losing subject
matter jurisdiction.
Court expired,
restitution

Once the one-year period after sentencing by this

this Court further lost jurisdiction over Mr. Garcia's

obligation.

Jurisdiction

moved

to

the

Board

at

the

expiration of the Court's jurisdiction over restitution.
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Accordingly, Mr. Garcia's Motion to Set Aside Restitution is denied.
Dated this_\_\_ _ day of April, 2014 .

.-- \

\
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

061901607

vs.
DENNIS J. GARCIA,

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Mr.

Dennis

Garcia's

("Mr.

Garcia") Motion for New Trial; Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment; and
Motion for Judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality.

Oral argument

was held August 11, 2014. The motions are ready for decision.
Discussion

Mr. Garcia was sentenced to 0-5 years in prison on June 2,
The Court left open the issue of restitution.
expired April

15,

2013.

On September 24,

2013,

Mr.
the

2008.

Garcia's sentence
Board of

Pardons

entered an Order of Restitution for $7,000 to the Utah Office of Victims
of Crime to cover the costs of the funeral expenses for Garcia's victim.
The Court entered the Order on October 10.
Mr.

Garcia

sought

to set

aside

the Order of

Restitution.

The

Court's Memorandum Decision of April 11, 2014 concluded that the trial
court does not have jurisdiction over this matter; rather,
was properly with the Board of Pardons.

jurisdiction

See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d
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("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it

loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case").
Mr.

Garcia now re-raises his arguments in a series of similar

motions: Motion for Ne~ Trial, Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment, and
Motion for Judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality. 1
Court to reconsider its April

11 decision;

He asks the'

set aside the Order of

Restitution; order a new trial for error of law under Rule 59, U.R.C.P;
and relieve him from the Judgment under Rule 60, for mistake, fraud, and
a void Judgment.
Mr. Garcia reiterates his previous argument that the trial court
maintains jurisdiction (concurrent with the Board of Pardons) over this
matter because (i) an Order of Restitution is a legal Judgment, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-401(4), and the trial court's entry of the Order restores
its jurisdiction over the matter, and (b)

the Utah Supreme Court has

irnplici tly held that the trial court has unending jurisdiction after
sentencing.

State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, 214 P.3d 104.

The Court

reiterates its prior determination that it has been

divested of jurisdiction.

Mr. Garcia's rehash of his prior arguments

adds no persuasive authority to change the Court's decision.

As for the

Laycock case, at first blush, Mr. Garcia is correct: Laycock allowed the

The State filed a Motion to Strike, noting that Mr. Garcia's motions are duplicative and
redundant. The State is correct, but the Court opts to treat the Motions together as they
significantly overlap. The Motion to Strike is denied.
1
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trial court to issue an order of restitution beyond the one-year date
from sentencing, contrary to§ 77-38a-302{5) (d)'s provision ·that after
the one-year mark, any issue of restitution goes to the Board of Pardons;
Mr. Garcia suggests L~ycock stands for the premise that the provision
does not divest the Court of authority over restitution.

Mr. Garcia is'

incorrect; the statute did not include the one-year rule when Laycock was
rendered, thus negating Garcia's reliance on that case.
Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court may not entertain Mr. Garcia's additional arguments that (a) the
Order of Restitution is void for being served beyond the 60-day rule,
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6 (4),

(b) the Order of Restitution is barred by

the statute of limitations, and (c) the Order of Restitution is void as
based on an unconstitutional statute.
Because this ~ourt lost jurisdiction over this criminal matter, Mr.
Garcia is not entitled to the relief he is seeking in this case.
motions are denied.

His

The Court directs counsel for the State to prepare

an Order consistent with this decision.
Dated this

2,1

day of August, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

the

..;)l

hereby certify that I emailed/mailed a true and correct copy of

foregoing

-1.---

Memorandum

Decision and Order, to the following,

day of August, 2014;

Sharel S. Reber
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Utah Board of Pardons
P.O. Box 140812
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812
Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Defendant
2877 West 9150 South
West Jordan, Utah 84088
shomerlaw@netzero.com
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SHAREL S. REBER (#7966)
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (#7969)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Utah Board of Pardons
PO Box 140812
160 East 300 South 5 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812
Telephone: (801) 366-0216-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF THE COURT

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 061901607

DENNIS J. GARCIA,
Judge: Randall N. Skanchy
Defendant.

A hearing on Mr. Garcia's Motion for a New Trial, Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment,
and Motion for Judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality was held August 11, 2014, before
the Honorable Randall N. Skanchy. Mr. Garcia was represented by his legal counsel, Stephen G.
Homer, and the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) was represented by its counsel,
Assistant Attorney General, Share) S. Reber.

Having carefully reviewed all the pleadings submitted by both parties, having heard oral
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argument from both parties, having taken the matter under advisement to further consider the
legal authorities cited by both parties and the oral argument presented by the parties, being fully
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following:

BACKGROUND
Mr. Garcia was sentenced to 0-5 years in prison on June 2, 2008, with the Court leaving
open the issue of restitution. Mr. Garcia's sentence expired April 15, 2013, and on September
24, 2013, the Board entered an Order of Restitution for $7,000 to the Utah Office of Victims of
Crime for the costs of the funeral expenses for Garcia's victim. The Court entered that Order on
October I 0, 2013.
Mr. Garcia sought to set aside the Order of Restitution, but in the Court's Memorandum
Decision of April 11, 2014, the Court concluded that the trial court does not have jurisdiction
over this matter; rather, jurisdiction was properly with the Board. See State v. Montoya, 825
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter
jurisdiction over the case").
Mr. Garcia re-raised his arguments in a series of similar motions: Motion for New Trial;
Motion to Set Aside Civil Judgment; and Motion for Judicial Determination of
Unconstitutionality. He asked the Court to reconsider its April 11 decision, set aside the Order
of Restitution, order a new trial for error oflaw under Rule 59, U.R.C.P, and relieve him from
the Judgment under Rule 60, U.R.C.P, for mistake, fraud, and a void Judgme.nt.

ORDER OF THE COURT
Mr. Garcia reiterated his previous argument that the trial court maintains jurisdiction
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(concurrent with the Board) over this matter because (a) an Order of Restitution is a legal
Judgment, Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-401(4), and the trial court's entry of the Order restores its
jurisdiction over the matter, and {b) the Utah Supreme Court has implicitly held that the trial
court has unending jurisdiction after sentencing. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,214 P.3d 104.
The Court reiterates i-ts prior determination that it has been divested of jurisdiction. Mr.
Garcia's rehash of his prior arguments adds no persuasive authority to change the Court's
decision. Addressing the Laycock case, at first blush, Mr. Garcia is correct: Laycock allowed
the trial court to issue an order of restitution beyond the one-year date from sentencing, contrary
to § 77-38a-302(5)(d)'s provision that after the one-year mark, any issue of restitution goes to the
Board. Mr. Garcia suggests Laycock stands for the premise that the provision does not divest the
Court of authority over restitution. Mr. Garcia is incorrect; the statute did not include the oneyear rule when Laycock was rendered, thus negating Garcia's reliance on that case.
Because the Couri does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may not entertain
Mr. Garcia's additional arguments that (a) the Order of Restitution is void for being served
beyond the 60-day rule, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6(4), (b) the Order of Restitution is barred by
the statute of limitations, and (c) the Order of Restitution is void as based on an unconstitutional
statute.
Because this Court lost jurisdiction over this criminal matter, Mr. Garcia is not entitled to
the relief he is seeking in this case. His motions are denied. This is the final order of the Court;
no further order is required. This is the end of the Order of the Court in this matter, and the
Court's signature and seal appear at the top of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing "ORDER OF THE

COURT" postage prepaid, on this 28 th day of August, 2014, to the foliowing:
Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Defendant
2877 West 9150 South
West Jordan, UT 84088
Jacob Franklin
Attorney for Utah Office of State Debt Collection
State Office Building
Box I 001
Salt Lake City 94114-1001
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PRIVATE
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
· SALTLAKEA.P.&P.
36 W FREMONT A VE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 239-2244
PRESENTENCE REPORT
Date Due: 05/28/2008
Sentencing Date: 06/02/2008

JUDGE RANDALL SKANCHY 1 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT

LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE
- - - SALT
- --- - - - - -- - -- - - - - (CITY)
(COUNTY)

UTAH

AIDA WOODWARD, INVESTIGATOR
NAME:

GARC[A, DENNIS JOSEPH

OFFENDER#:

AKA'S:

PROS.ATTY:

ADDRESS:

DEF.ATTY:
INTERPRETER:
LANGUAGE:

BIRTH DATE
MARITAL STATUS:

CODEFENDANTS:

COURT CASE
061901607

OFFENSE
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, TIIlRD DEGREE FELONY

184816
MICHAEL COLBY
JOE ORIFICI
NONE .
ENGLSfH
NONE

PLEA

CONVICTION
DATE

NOT GUILTY

04/17/08

RECOMMENDATION:
It is respectfully recommended by the staff of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant is sentenced to
serve the term at the Utah State Prison as prescribed by law.
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PRESENTENCE REPORT
DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AND RESTITUTION:
Telephone contact was made with the deceaseu··-rc.10ther, !I & ft.$ Mrs. •••plans to be present for
sentencing, but is unsure at this time if she will wish to speak to the Court. Mrs. • • • states that she feels it
was evident during testimony that the defendant had no other concern other than for himself and made no
attempt after the accident to obtain medical assistance for . . . . She states that regarding restitution she did
file a civil suit in order for Shane's automobile insurance to pay for the accident. She states the matter is still
pending collection from the company and that they have asked for an additional • • • which was over the
amount covered for the funeral expenses by Crime Victim Reparations.
According to the Utah Office of Crime Victim Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses in this
offense. Reference CVR# 151627
restitution payments.

for

DEFENDANT'S LIFE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIVING SITUATION:
The defendant was born in Utah and is the yowigest of four children born to and
. He
reports having a normal/close family having excellent relationships with his parents and no particular problems
other than both parents are <lea£ He states it was a problem when he was younger as he felt oilier people ma4e
fun and took advantage of his deaf parents. He feels he had a good childhood and his parents did· a good job
raising their family he had everything he could wish for as a child. In June 1998 the defendant married his
longtime girlfriend,
d . They have three children together. who boin before they were legally married.
Since their divorce in 2002 he feels they have maintained a "rocky" relationship. The defendant is not
romantically involved with anyone at present and has recently felt he should try to work thing·s out with his exwife. He reports that around 2004 be started hanging out with the "wrong crowd." Since this accidentthough,
he has quit drinking and using illegal drugs. He reporls that God has become a major part of his life and he's
realized how precious life is and how much, God, his children, his family and a couple good friends really mean
to him. The defendant was living with hi~ parents in their •••lllhome before his incarceration..

EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION:
The defendant attended
. through the tenth grade, but finished with his diploma from
an alternative school in 1992. He has received some· advance ·sign language training since
graduation and is interested in going to school to become a sign language interpreter. He reports he knows sign
language now as it was the primacy language in his home while growing up. The defendant has worked in
various jobs including_ customer service and construction work. Prior to this offense he was working
construction but suffered injuries in this accident and could no longer do the work. Prior to coming to jail in
April 2008 he was working as a Customer Service Representative part time for an internet coaching business
out of
. The defendant has some past due bills for child supp0f4 rent and personal loans from
family members. Since this offense he feels he has gotten himself "buried in debt."

. & iJbit
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL BUCKLEY vs. DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA
CASE NUMBER 080903244 Wrongful Death

vi)

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
ROYAL I HANSEN
PARTIES
Plaintiff - GAIL BUCKLEY
Represented by: MARGARET H OLSON
Defendant - DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA
Represented by: SYLVIA G ACOSTA
y) ACCOUNT SUMMARY

TOTAL REVENUE

REVENUE DETAIL

Amount Due:

233.50

Amount Paid:

233.50

Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

-

TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT s

Amount Due:

155.00

Amount Paid:

155.00

Amount Credit:

0.00

Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL

-

TYPE: JURY DEMAND

-

CIVIL

Amount Due:

75.00

Amount Paid:

75.00

Amount Credit:

0.00

-Balance:

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL

-

TYPE: COPY FEE

Amount Due:

3.50

Amount Paid:

3.50

Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.00

0.00

CASE NOTE
,i;pRQCEEDINGS
02-25-08 Case filed
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CASE NUMBER 080903244 Wrongful Death

02-25-08 Judge VERNICE TREASE assigned.
02-25-08 Filed: Complaint

No Amount

02-25-08 Filed: Demand Civil Jury
02-25-08 Fee Account created

Total Due:

155.00

02-25-08 Fee Account created

Total Due:

75.00

02-25-08 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S

155.00

Payment Received:

Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, Code
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL, Mail Payment;
02-25-08 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL

75.00

Payment Received:

04-24-08 Filed: Answer
DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA
04-30-08 Filed return: Summons with Affidavit of Service
Party Served: GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: April 14, 2008
08-08-08 Filed: Joint Motion and Stipulation for Dismissal with
Prejudice
Filed by: ACOSTA, SYLVIA G
08-12-08 Filed order: Order for Dismissal with Prejudice
Judge VERNICE TREASE
Signed August 12, 2008
08-12-08 Case Disposition is Dismissed
Disposition Judge is VERNICE TREASE
08-17-12 Judge ANDREW H STONE assigned.
11-02-12 Judge DENO HIMONAS assigned.
03-24-14 Fee Account created
03-24-14 COPY FEE

3.50

Total Due:
Payment Received:

3.50
~

1. 50 change given.

Note: 5.00 cash tendered.
03-16-15 Judge ROYAL I HANSEN assigned.
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GA.IL BUCKELY, intli-vidup.Uy .md as personal representatwe of thL'I ESTATE OF
'l'llOMAS SHANE BUCKELY V, DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA
· Thil'd Judicial Dlstnct Conrt, bi and for Salt Lake, State of Utah, Case No

080903244
Gene.-al Release and Settle~ent Agreement
For and in considera.tion of tb payment to the undea1igo.ed, OAlL BUCKLEY,
individually and on behalf of the estate and·heirs of THOMAS SHANE BUCK.ELY, for
11nd fn the sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 CENTS ($25,000.00), tho
receipt and sufficienoy of whk.b are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned on her own
behalf and for all hem, oicecutors, admini&llatots and assigns, does hereby RELEASE
and FOREVER DISCHARGE UNITED AUTOMOB1LE INSURANCE COMPANY
(hereinafter referred to as ''UNITED"), its offioora, directors, employees, :insurers and/or
successors (collectively ''the parties'' and Its inSllI"ed(s), DENNIS JOSEPH GARCIA
{hereinafter the 1'Insured11). if any. from. any claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes
of action, losses of services, property damage, repairs, c.osts, tind expenses or
compensations, of· any natUre whatsoever, resulting from or relating to the
aforementioned claims nrislng from the car acctde.nt oCC\ll"ring on or about-March 8,
2006, The details are more fully set forth in the litigation entitled GAU.. BUCKELY,
individUQUy lllld es personal t~Ollentath'e of tho ESTATE OF TIIOMA.S SHANE
BUCI<ELY V. DBNNlS JOSEPH OAllClA Civil No. 080903244, Third Judicjal District
Court, S!ilt Lake County, Ste.te of Utah. It is int6Jlded, that this Agreement shall relievo
United1 its officers, directors, employees, insums and/or 5uocessors and its insured, if
any, :from any further duties, responsibili1ias1 or oblig11tfons relating to or arisiiig from the
accident, or any other action or mactio1l by United o:r the insured relating thereto. ·

Nothing contained herein, nor the oonsununation of this Agreement, shall be
construed or deemed ns IUl admission of liability, oulpability1 .negligence, or wrongdoing
on the part of United or the iDsured. The Parties hereto ha:vo entered into this Agreem.m1t
with the intention to avoid further litigation with its attendant inconveniences and
expenses. Inespectiv:a of whether tllis Agreement is fully con&lmll'Dated, nothing
contained herein, or a-cy prior draft bereo~ ot in any form of communication pertaining to
the consummati_on of this Agreement. shall be construed or det1med at any Ume or plaoe,
or in any proeeeding11, to be an admission or conco$S!on, expressed or implied, of any
allegation, inference, implication, or charse
w,:oogdoing, liability. negligence,
culpllhility, or lack thereof hy the Parli~. This Agreement may be pled or PSSerted by or
on behalf of the Parties as a defense and complete b11r to 11JJ.Y action. claim, cou:uter-cbrlm,
cross-claim, cause of action, demand or proceeding that mo.y be brought, inlJtituted, 01:
taken, against ox on behnlf of the Parties with respect to any of the matters set forth
herein, excepting only tmY obligations duly arising out of the terms of this Agreement.

or

lt is understood end agreed that subject to the terms und conditions of this
Agreement the payment of the SUJI1S referenced herein by or on behalf of United or Its
insursd are made and aooepted in compromise lllld settlement of disputed claims, and that
this Agreement shall terminate all issues which have been, might have been, or oould be
raised io any suit, or action in ony co\lrt of law or equity, ot any judicial, quasi-judicial,
I'
I

I
I

I
I

I
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or administrative forum, arlmlg from or relating to the aforeme.ntioned claims and
accident, and any otber ~tion or inaction by United or the insured relating thereto.
The Po:rties represent at the time of execution of this Agreeme11t that they are
authorized and competent to exeouto this Agreement, and furthermore, each of them
acknowledge that they either hi\Vo sought and obtained the advice of counsel concerning
the rights and obligationa confirmed by this Agreement or they ba.ve ex.pressly nnd
knowingly waived the opport\lnity to seek and obtain the advice of counsel concerning
the rights and obligations confirmed by this Agreement.

The Parties each .acknowledge 1hat: (i) they are executing this Agreement in
reliance so]ely on their own judgment, belie~ and knowledge, and upon the advice of
their legal counsel if sought; (ii) no promise> inducement or agreement not herein
expressed has been made to any Party by any other Party, or person aoting on b!s behalf;
(iii) the terms and conditioJlS contained herein are contractual and not mere recltels; and
(iv) this Agreement contains tl10 entire Agreement between the Parties hereto.
This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding of the Parties replacing Wl.Y
and all prior agreements relating to the subject matte, hereof. Thi~ Agreement may be
changed, amended, or temtln.ated, only by a similar written instrument executed by all
Pmties to be bound thereby.

If any provision of this Agreement is he~d to be unlawfu~ invalid, or
unenforceable u11der any present or future laws. such provision shall be fully sev.~able;
and this Agreement shall then be constroed and enforced· as if such unlawful, invalid, or
unenforoeable provision had not been a pnrt hereof. Tue remaining pro"Visions of thui
Agreement shall remain in full force snd effect and shall not be affected by suah
unlawful, invalid, or \tnonforceable provision or by its severnnQe therefrom.
Furthennore, in lieu of such unla-wful, invalid or unenforceable provision, there shall be
added automatically as a part of this Ag:reemen½ a provision as shnile.r in terms to such
unlawful, invalid or unenforceable provision as may be possible nnd legal, valid end
enforceable.
·
The individuals executing this Geperal Release and Se~oment Agreement
represent that ea.ch has full authority to enter into and sign Uris Release and Agreement on
behalf of the entities so released.

2
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.. .

Dated this~ da.y _of t
. . ..... ... . - .--.

2008.

GA.Il., BUCKLEY, on behalf of tho b .
Thomas Shane Bucldoy
STATE OP UTA.IICOUNTY OF

I
I-

)

Ll.kY1 /s.
\l

-

1

On this Ji_ day of , ,1.\1~
2008 person.ally appeared before
me1 Gail Buckley known p ~ to mo (ot satisfactorily proven) to be the peison(s)
whose names &re subscribed to on this General e ase and Settlemeot"A9J:r.efi1ent, and
b~ing first duly sworn. acknowledged that they vol
· and _wini!Yl~eQufea. the

same.

_(hJ!.!4~~-41,ML~~'U.-.O...a.-.----

,.

I

I,;)

I
I
I

I

If
I

I

I

...i)

r
I

I
I

I
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GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH

USP# 47-·

Offender# 184816

Printed 10/07/2010

PCF BB 21

Page 1 of 1

Members
Curtis L. Garner
Jesse Gallegos
Robert S. Yeates
Angela F. Micklos

Gary R. Herbert

Governor
Clark A. Harms
Chairman

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Offender # 184816
Consideration of the Status of _D_e_nn_i_s_J_o_se_,p._h_G_a_rc_ia_ _ _ _ _ _ _~ - - - -

USP # 4-"2=9=9'-'4_ _

The above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the 5th day of October,
2010 for:
·
ORIGINAL HEARING

After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board makes the following decision and order:
Results

1.

Effective Date

EXPIRATION OF INMATE SENTENCE

4/15/2013

Hearing Notes
1. Other: The restitution owed of$ 7000.00 on Case# 06-1607 will be forwarded to the sentencing Court for a Civil Judgement.
2.

Final decision of the hearing held

No
1.

Crime
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE

on 10/05/2010.
_Se_n_t_ _ _
Ca_s_e_No_._ _ .:..Ju=-d_.,gcc..e_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Expiration
0-5

061901607

SKANCHY

4/15/2013

This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual release from custody.
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 7th day of October, 2010, affixed my signature as
Chairman for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

Clark A. Harms, Chairman
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GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH

USP# 4t'"'
.

-·

Offender# 184816

PCF BB 21

_...

....

Printed 10/13/201 O
Page 1 o! 1

Members
Curtis L. Gamer
Jesse Gallegos
Robert S. Yeates
Angela F. Micklos

Gary R. Herbert
Governor
Clark A. Harms
Chairman

BEFORE THE SOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Offender# 184816
Consideration of the Status of .: .D. c.e:. :.nnc,;.:i.: .s. c.J. ; . os.: .e: .Jp:. :.h:. :.G=a:. . :rc:. . :ia: . .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

USP #4...:..:2=9=94..,____

HEARING OFFICER RESULTS

After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board makes the following decision and order:
Results

Effective Date

1.

10/13/2010

NOCHANGE

Hearing Notes

1.

No change in the expiration of inmate sentence on 04/15/2013. ·.

2.
3.

Other:

The Board of Pardons is aware this is not a regular release date... CLERICAL: ER~OR CORRECTED.

No
1.

Crime
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE

, •

The restitution owed will be forwarded to the s~tencing 0"c::ourt for a Civil Jildgerileht.

_Se_n_t_ _ _
C_as_e_N_o_._ _ :=.;Ju=-=d==g-=-e_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Expiration
0-5
061901607
SKANCHY
4/15/2013

This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual release from custody.
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 13th day.of October, 2010, affixed my signature as
Chairman for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

Clark A. Harms, Chairman
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BOARD OF l. ::-iillONS & PAROLE
448 East 6400 Somh, Suite 300
Murray, Utah 84107
Tel (801) 261-6464
Fax (801) 261-6481
www.bop.utah.gov
Gary R. Herbert
Governor
Clark A. Harms
Chainnan
Angela F. Micklos
l'ice Chair
Jesse GaUegos
Curtis L. Garner
Robert S. Yeates
Members

May17,2011

Family and Friends of Dennis Garcia
3952 W. 8620 So.
West Jordan, Utah 84088

RE: Dennis Garcia
Offender # 184816
To Whom It May Concern,
The Board of Pardons has received your letter and I have been asked to respond. You
ask that re-consider the decision to keep Dennis in prison for the full five year term given
by the Judge.
As you may be aware, Dennis Garcia is in prison for Automobile Homicide, havipg
killed his friend and passenger. The Board of Pardons has the administrative ability to
give him the full five years, so it would appear very fortunate_ that Aaron only received
the Third Degree Felony he did.
Although we acknowledge the support at his Original Hearing, it was not a popularity
contest, so no weight is given just because his friends were there, and the victim's family
wasn't. I will send the inmate a copy of the Aggravating and Mitigating factors ifhe did
not receive one. When released from prison, it is hoped that Dennis will never do another
horrendous crime such as this. If he is working inside, it is hoped he has already started to
pay the $7,000 burial expenses. As you have now brought that to our attention, I will
send a copy of this to Crime Victims Reparations who will be seeking that restitution
amount (CVR # 151627) as we will pursue a Civil Judgment against him.
Respectfully,

,O_

~~ w vy: { ;

·--

Kent Wm. Jones
Senior Hearing Officer

CC:
~

Board file
Dennis Garcia
Caseworker Phillip Green
Lori Maroney-CVR
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Offender No:

184816

DENNIS GARCIA

Location: PROMONTORY

DD 11

3/18/2013

3/31/2013

Begin Bal:

End Bal:

78.76

45.37

Amount

Balance

Utlh Department of Corrections
NORM Offender Accounting System

ii;

INMATE ACCOUNT STA'TEMENT

From: 3/18/2013 To: 3/31/2013

Qi)

Offender No:

First Name:

Last Name:

184816

DENNIS

GARCIA

Transaction Detail
Document No

~

Posting Date

Description

1286469-001

3/18/2013

Commissary 03/18/13

-12.85

65.91

1291862-001

3/25/2013

Commissary 03/25/13

-20.54

45.37

AvaDable Balance as of 3/31/2013

45.37

Victim Restitution
Restitution Balance:

Restitution Interest:

Balance:

0.00

0.00

0.00

;.di)

·-.0
DISCLAIMER: The victim restitution information listed above is based upon data that is currently documented in
NORM. There may be other outstanding victim obligations not yet entered.
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,)ffender #: 184816

USP#; 42994

Location: UINTA 3

GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH

Utah Department of Corrections
SOUTH POINT
STATEM.ENT, OF ACCOUNT

Offender Account Activity
Statement Date: 05/31/2008

Page 1 c.

To: 00,13/2008

ACCOUNT TRANSACTION DETAIL:
Account: GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH
Account Balance: 64.68
Debit

Trans. ID

Trans. Date

Transaction Description

1055149
1055848

Beginning Balance
06/05/2008 Cash Receipt - INTAKE
06/09/2008 Commissary Purchase; Invoice 840536
Ending Balance

Credit

Account Balance

82.08

17.40

0.00
82.08
64.68
64.68

Q

Victim Restitution (NORM}:
Principle: $0.00

Interest: $0.00

Balance: $0.00

DISCLAIMER: The victim restitution Information listed above Is based upon data that Is currently documented
in NORM. There may be other outstanding victim restitution obligations not yet entered.

MESSAGES:
Please write to Inmate Accounting if you have any questions about your account. Thank you.

Otfender #: 184816

USP #: 42994

@

Location: UINTA 3

GARCIA, DENNIS JOSEPH
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Cell: 209B

